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This study examines every reported federal district and appellate court
opinion between 1986-1995 involving sexual harassment in the work-
place-nearly 650 opinions in all. The methodology is to code over 100
variables for each case in an "objective" manner, meaning that persons with
legal training should not differ in the coding, and then to statistically ana-
lyze correlations and trends among variables. This method sef-consciously
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differs from the traditional legal metlwd of analyzing leading cases, and the
Article describes the distinctive features, benefits, and problems of this
method.
Among the findings are that a disproportionate number ofplaintiffs are
blue-collar or clerical workers, although most cases arise from mixed rather
than sex-segregated workplaces. Most defendants are private employers, but
a disproportionately large fraction are government employers. Most cases in-
volve harassment by supervisors rather than coworkers alone. Successful
cases are likely to involve sexualized conduct directed at individual victims.
Sexual harassment claims involving dfferential but nonsexual conduct and
conduct demeaning to women in general arefar less successfiutl Cilicalfac-
tors for a successful case are that the victim complained within the organiza-
tion and that the employer had established no formal process to deal with
sexual harassment issues.
INTRODUCTION
How do sexual harassment claims fare in the federal courts?
What facts and issues do the federal courts face. What circumstances
make a successful claim? Have things changed over time? Are the
horror stories true? Do courts find employers liable for a single joke
or sexual story? Although widespread sexual harassment has existed
for decades, and litigation has proceeded for over twenty years, de-
tailed knowledge about these issues is still lacking.
This Article presents the first systematic study of sexual harass-
ment cases in the federal courts.2 We have read and analyzed accord-
1 The case of Macenzie v. Miller Brewing, 608 N.V.2d 331 (Wis. App. 2000). received
much media attention. Known as the "Seinfeld" case, the plaintiff in Mackenzie was fired
for recounting the plot line of a Seinfidd episode. Id. at 336. When a coworker complained
of harassment based on this recounting, Mackenzie was fired. He sued for xwTongful termi-
nation. The district court dismissed the claim, id., and the appellate court affirmed, id. at
361.
2 Studies or overviews which address the legal system tend to concentrate on one
area such as a particular state, federal district, or wvithin a particular year. S, e.g., Nancy L
Abell, et al., Recent Developments in Sexual Harassment Litigation, C902 ALI-ABA 637 (1994)
(reviewing facts and holdings of federal and California sexual harassment cases for 1993),
availabe atWL C902 ALI-ABA 637; Frances S. Coles, Forced to Quit: Sexual Harassment Com-
plaints and Agency Response 14 SEx RoLxs 81 (1986) (examining eighty-eight cases filed ith
California State Fair Employment and Housing Department between 1979 and 1983);John
F. Dickinson & Richard N. Margulies, Employent Discritnination, 41 NMfc: L RE%, 1303
(1990) (surveying significant sexual discrimination cases by the Eleventh Circuit for the
1989judicial year); Ven E. Hauck & Thomas G. Pearce, Sexual Harasment and Arbitration,
43 LaB. LJ. 31 (1992) (revi-ing 100 labor arbitration awards in sexual harassment cases);
Lynn BrundageJongleux, Developments in Employmen tDiscrimination Law, 20 L%'N. L RE%, 243
(1987) (surveying recent developments in Seventh Circuit employment discrimination
law); J. Ren6 Josey, Labor and Employment, 36 S.C. L REv. 179 (1985) (surveying South
Carolina labor and employment law); Barbara A. Lee, Discrimination Against Students in
HigherEducation: A Review of the 1996Judial Dedcsions, 24J.C. & U.L 619 (1998) (revieing
discrimination cases brought by college students in the 1996judicial year); Elaine Massock,
Survey ofllinois Law: Emplo'ment Law, 22 S. ILu. U. UJ. 841 (1998) (reie ving 1997 employ-
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ing to quantifiable factors every reported federal district court and
appellate court opinion on sexual harassment in the workplace from
1986 to 1996-a total of nearly 650 opinions.3
These 650 cases comprise only a fraction of sexual harassment
litigation,4 and an even smaller fraction of all workplace incidences of
sexual harassment.5 Complaints continue to pour into the Equal Em-
ment decisions in Illinois); Patricia L. Ogden, Survey of Labor and Employment Law Develop-
mentsfor Indiana Practitioners, 31 IND. L. REv. 567 (1998) (reviewing labor and employment
decisions in Indiana and the Seventh Circuit); Ramona L. Paetzold & Anne M. O'Leary.
Kelly, Continuing Violations and Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: When is Enough,
Enough, 31 Am. Bus. LJ. 365 (1993) (reviewing cases discussing the continuing violation
exception to the statute of limitations).
In addition, academics have performed empirical studies on other aspects of Title VIL
See, e.g., Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical
Study of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59 U. Ct. L,
REv. 1073 (1992) (reporting empirical study of the judicial response to the lack of interest
defense in the context of job segregation cases); Richard C. Sorenson et al., Solving the
Chronic Problem of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: An Empirical Study of Factors 4ffecting
Employee Perceptions and Consequences of Sexual Harassment, 34 CAL. V. L. REv. 457 (1998)
(examining factors that influence how sexual behavior is perceived by "reasonable" peo-
ple); Julie A. Springer et al., Survey of Selected Evidentiary Issues in Employment Law Litigation,
50 BAYLOR L. REv. 415 (1998) (surveying law on evidentiary issues in employment litiga-
tion); see also Maya Alexandri, Note, The Student Summer Associate Experience with Harassing
Behaviors: An Empirical Study and Proposal for Private Party Action, 19 VOMEN's RTs. L. RP. 43
(1997) (analyzing summer associates' experiences with sexual harassment); Donna Shes-
towsky, Note, Where is the Common Knowledge? Empirical Support for Requiring Expert Testimony
in Sexual Harassment Trials, 51 STAN. L. REv. 357 (1999) (examining the need for expert
testimony in sexual harassment trials).
3 See infra Part I for a description of the database.
4 See David N. Laband & Bernard F. Lentz, The Effects of Sexual Harassment on Job Satis-
faction, Earnings, and Turnover Among Female Lawyers, 51 INDUS. & LAB. REL. Rzv. 594, 594
(1998) ("[Slexual harassment... [c]omplaints filed with the [EEOC] have skyrocketed
during the past ten years."); Cathy Jones, Set Policy on Sexual Harassment is Best Protection,
DALLAS Bus.J.,Jan. 15, 1999, at 37 ("[S]exual harassment claims have increased... [and]
... [t]his upward trend is expected to continue."); AmyJoyce, An Alternative Sexual Harass-
ment Poliy: Insurance, WASH. PosT, May 17, 1998, at H4 ("Employee discriminatory claims
have nearly quadrupled in the past four years.. . ."); Albert R. Karr, Work Week, WALt Sr.J.,
Dec. 29, 1998, at Al ("[D]iscrimination complaints filed with the (EEOC] keep climbing
... [to] ... over 16,000 sexual-harassment cases [expected] in 1998, up from 6,883 in
1991."); Andre Mouchard, Experts: Fewer Harass at Work, ORANGE Coumy Rgo., Feb. 10,
1996, at C1 ("Complaints about sexual harassment are on the rise."); N.H. Sees Jump in Sex
Complaints, BoSrON GLOBE, May 20, 1996, at 23 ("[G]reater awareness is responsible for a
30 percent increase in the number of sexual harassment complaints filed in New Hamp-
shire in the past year."); Elizabeth Shogren, Sex Harassment Message Often Unheeded, Many
Women Contend, LA. TiMEs, Sept. 12, 1995, at DI ("[U]nwelcome passes, groping and sexu-
ally offensive comments are still rampant in the workplace."). But see Don Lee, Complaints
of Sex Harassment Decline in State, LA. Timzs, Oct. 14, 1996, at Al (reporting that the num-
ber of sexual harassment allegations filed with the state Department of Fair Employment
and Housing dropped 3%, ending over a decade of consecutive increases).
5 See BARBARA A. Gurx, SEx AND THE WORKPLACE 46 tbl.2 (1985) (reporting that
53.1% of the women in a study identified themselves as victims of sexual harassment): U.S.
MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., SExuAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL WORKPLAcE, TRENDS, PROGREss,
CONTINUING CHALLENGES 13 (1995) (explaining that 42% of women in a study of federal
employees in 1980 reported having experienced harassing behavior compared with 42% in
1987 and 44% in 1994); Claire Safran, What Men Do to Women on the Job: A Shocking Look at
550
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ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),6 and litigation in state
and federal courts continues to increase.7 Our set of cases is high up
on the naming-blaming-claiming litigation pyramid.8 We doubt that
SexualHarassmen4 RroDBoOi, Nov. 1976, at 149, 217 (reporting that nearly 90% of the 9000
women that responded to readers' questionnaire entitled, "How Do You Handle Sex on
the Job?" had personally experienced sexual harassment in the workplace ranging from
"leering and ogling" to overt requests for sexual favors).
6 In 1990, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission received 6000 sexual
harassment complaints. U.S. EQuAL F-PLOYhMtNr OpPxOrurn' Co.st'.v, Tn-xus is IR-
ASSMENT CHARGES Fami wrr Tm EEOC DURLING THE 1980s AND 1990s, available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/stats/harassment-html (last modifiedJuly 11, 2000). Beginning in 1995 and
continuing through 1998, the EEOC received over 15,000 sexual harassment complaints.
U.S. EQuAL EmpLOyENT OPPORTuNrry CO MI'N SEXUAL HARnss N-r CHARGEs, EEOC &
FEPAs Co.mInw: FY 1992 - FY 1998, available at http://v.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html
(last modifiedJan. 12, 2000) [hereinafter EEOC Report]; see also Elizabeth Grossman, Aa-
tional Women Law Students Association Conferene, Afardt 1, 1996: Written Remaris on W lence
Against Women, 11 Wis. WomN's LJ. 395, 399 (1997) ("The number of sexual harassment
charges filed at EEOC has increased by 112o since 1989 .... Sexual harassment charges
now represent more than 12% of total charges, compared to 6% five years ago."). Victims
who wish to sue in court must first file a charge with the Commission and receive either a
"right to sue" notice or a decision by the Commission not to proceed on the charge. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1994).
7 See Mary Chlopecki & Ellen Duffy McKay, The Dollar Impact of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act HR Focus, Sept. 1997, at 15 (stating that data maintained by the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts shows that an excess of 23,000 employment-related lawsuits
were filed in 1996, nearly triple from 1991, which was due in part to Civil Rights Act of
1991);JohnJ. Donohue I & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature ofEmployment Diseimi-
nation Litigation, 43 STAN. L REv. 983, 987 (1991) (suggesting that employment discrimina-
tion cases increase at a rate of 344 cases per year); Mark Hansen, Study ShowsJob Bias
Changin, A.BA.J., May 1991, at 34 (reporting that "[tihe number of employmentdacrim-
ination cases in the federal courts rose almost 2,200 percent in the past two decades, nearly
10 times the rate of all other civil litigation combined"); Richard C. Nfariani, Management
Strategies to Deal with Today's Rh4 N.J. LJ., May 13, 1996, at 11 ("The number of emplo-
ment discrimination cases in the federal courts has increased by more than 2,000 percent
in the past 20 years. It is estimated that the number of discrimination cases filed in the
federal courts wll continue to grow at an annual rate of about 10 percent."); Gerald D.
Skoning, FederalJudiciary Reluctant Personnel Czar CHI. Trm.,July 3, 1997, at N23 ("Over the
past five years, employment discrimination cases filed in federal court have increased at an
annual rate as high as 33 percent."); see also Marc Galanter, Case Congregations and Their
Careers, 24 Lkw & Soc'y REv. 371,373-76 (1990) (stating that types of litigation increase or
decrease at the same rate as the "underlying activity" that encourages that litigation); Carol
Kleiman, Winning Strategies forAvoiding Bias Suits CHI. Tam., Aug. 10, 1994, at C5 (stating
that since the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990, there has been a 22%
increase in employment discrimination claims).
8 The process of resolving grievances has been described as a pyramid. &e David M.
Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L REv. 72, 86-87 (1983). In this
pyramid, grievances ("blaming") form the bottom layer of the pyramid, follovw ed by claims.
Id. Claims for which redress is not granted become "disputes." Id. At the top layers of the
pyramid are those disputes which result in court filings and finally, those filings that result
in some sort ofjudicial intervention and opinion. Id.; see also William LF. Felstiner et al.,
The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming.... 15 LA'w & Soe'v
REv. 631, 635-36 (1981) (describing the stages by which an experience is transformed from
naming ("saying to oneself that a particular experience has been injurious"), to blaming ('a
person attributes an injury to the fault of another individual or social entity"), to claiming
("when someone with a grievance voices it to the person or entity believed to be responsi-
ble and asks for some remedy")).
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the federal cases in our database accurately reflect the workplace. In-
deed, a major theme in our inquiry is the degree to which the pub-
lished cases present a different picture from that seen by social
science researchers surveying the workplace or from the public per-
ception of sexual harassment litigation.
On the other hand, our 650 cases are substantially larger than the
number of cases legal scholars, who tend to focus on the leading
cases, typically examine. In other words, we do not focus exclusively
on the tip of the litigation pyramid. Another theme we explore is the
degree to which the leading cases are typical or distorted representa-
tions of the sweep of federal sexual harassment cases.
In Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,10 for example, the court
found that pornographic pinups contributed to the harassment of
Lois Robinson." Jacksonville Shipyards stimulated an ongoing scholarly
debate over the intersection (or collision) between Title VII protec-
tions and the First Amendment. In another notorious case involving
disturbing love letters, Ellison v. Brady,12 the Ninth Circuit adopted a
"reasonable woman" standard, judging the offensiveness of alleged
harassment from the perspective of a "reasonable woman" rather than
a "reasonable person." I3 This decision prompted an outpouring of
critical commentary on the wisdom of adopting or rejecting the rea-
sonable woman standard. 14
In addition to these leading appellate court opinions, the Sti-
preme Court cases inevitably become leading cases. In Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson,15 the Supreme Court first recognized sexual har-
assment as a violation of Title VII.16 In Hanis v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,17
the Court held that the plaintiff could bring a sexual harassment
9 Very few instances of sexual harassment reach litigation. See Danielle Foulls &
Marita P. McCabe, Sexual Harassment: Factors AffectingAttitudes and Perceptions, 37 SEx RoLE~s
773, 775 (1997) (noting that "only 1-7% of people who experience sexual harassment file
formal complaints"); see also Jeanne Henry & Julian Meltzoff, Perceptions of Sexual Harass-
ment as a Function of Target's Response Type and Observer's Sex, 39 Sax RoTEs 253, 255-56
(1998) (explaining that many women choose to ignore harassing conduct rather than to
confront or report it); Sharon Toffey Shepcla & Laurie L. Levesque, Poisoned Waters: Sexual
Harassment and the College Climate, 38 SEx RoLEs 589, 590 (1998) (discussing the fact that
sexual harassment is often not recognized or labeled as sexual harassment because offen-
sive conduct occurs so frequently within academic environments).
10 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
11 Id. at 1524-27. Although often overlooked in the debate overJacksonville Shipyards,
the plaintiff in that case testified not only to the presence of graffiti but also "about com-
ments of a sexual nature she recalled hearing... from coworkers." Id. at 1498.
12 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
13 Id. at 879.
14 See infra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
15 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
16 Id. at 73.
17 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
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claim without necessarily showing serious psychological harm.' 8 More
recently, in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,19 the Court up-
held a male employee's complaint of sexual harassment by male su-
pervisors and coworkers.2 0 The Court reported that the conduct
involved "sex-related, humiliating actions" including physical assault
and threatened rape,2 ' but in the "interest of both brevity and dignity"
declined to describe the precise details.22 Finally, the Court recently
sought to clarify the standards for employer liability in a pair of sexual
harassment cases. In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,23 a female lifeguard
complained about physical touchings and offensive comments by her
supervisors.24 The Court held that an employer is subject to vicarious
liability for a hostile environment created by a supervisor unless the
employer can show "that [it] exercised reasonable care to prevent and
correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and... that the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any pre-
ventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm othenvise."2 The companion case of Burlington Industries,
Inc. v. Ellerth 6 involved "boorish and offensive remarks" about a
worker's clothing and breasts, including never-carried-out threats to
deny her a promotion and other tangible job benefits.2 7 The Court
held that, because hostile environment cases require a showing of se-
vere or pervasive conduct the labels "quid pro quo" or "hostile envi-
ronment" were relevant in determining whether discrimination exists
but did not control the analysis of employer liability once a finding of
discrimination is made.28
The present study goes beyond these leading cases and their fact
patterns. In broadening the traditional analytical legal approach, we
have foregone the ability to examine the nuances of particular cases
and doctrinal debates among judges. However, we have gained per-
spective on the bulk of the issues and fact patterns with which federal
judges wrestle. These fact patterns inform judges about sexual harass-
ment, who in turn create sexual harassment laws (within, of course,
18 Id. at 22.
19 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
20 Id. at 82.
21 Id. at 77.
22 I. The lower courts were less circumspect. The Fifth Circuit noted that the actions
in question included restraining the victim while another coworker put his penis on the
victim's neck, and pushing a bar of soap into the victim's anus. Oncale v. Sundoimer
Offshore Sers., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118-19 (5th Cir. 1996).
23 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
24 Id. at 780.
25 I& at 807.
26 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
27 I, at 747.
28 Id. at 751.
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the broad parameters laid out by Congress). This sweep of cases,
then, presents a particularly important perspective.
After describing the study in Part I, we sketch a portrait of sexual
harassment cases in the federal courts in Part II. We describe the
plaintiffs (e.g., sex, occupation, employment status, the number of
plaintiffs suing together), the defendants (e.g., private business or
government, coworker or supervisor, the number of harassers), and
alleged harassment (e.g., verbal or physical, directed at the plaintiff
specifically or all women).
In Part Im, we examine success rates for district court plaintiffs.
Stated quite simply, the horror stories are not true. Our findings do
not support the claims that plaintiffs succeed on cases alleging mere
jokes or a single incident of allegedly harassing behavior. Here we
conclude that successful claims involve allegations of physical harass-
ment and verbal harassment of a sexual nature directed at the plain-
tiff. The existence, or lack thereof, of a grievance program greatly
affects the employer's liability as does the employer's prior knowledge
of the harassment.
In Part IV, we compare our findings for the district courts with
those for the appellate courts. Our study shows that Title VII plaintiffs
are as successful as other plaintiffs in appellate courts.
In Part V, we look at trends over time. Interestingly, the claims
and success rates did not dramatically change after the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, nor after the 1993 Supreme Court decision in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc.29
Finally, in Part VI, we examine three important issues in sexual
harassment cases that are reflected in the commentary: the presence
of pornography in the workplace as a violation of Title VII; the reason-
able woman standard; and the conceptualization of sexual harass-
ment. First, many commentators analyzing the implications of sexual
harassment have focused on pornography in the workplace. Our
study shows that although pornography in the workplace implicates
important First Amendment issues, few cases in our study involved
pornography in the absence of other claims. Second, a relatively
small number of courts mention the reasonable woman standard but
when courts do mention the standard, plaintiffs have a higher success
rate than in cases where courts mention the reasonable person
standard.
Third, there is an ongoing debate among legal scholars over the
conceptualization of sexual harassment.30 As Professors Katherine M.
29 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (holding that sexual harassment claim does not require
showing of psychological harm).
30 See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harassment, 83 CORNELL L,
REv. 1169 (1998); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARv. L,
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Franke and Kathiyn Abrams describe the debate, this is the "why"
question of sexual harassment-why is sexual harassment a violation
of Title VII?3 1 After describing the recent work of four scholars, we
conclude that our findings support the critique that courts view sexual
harassment too narrowly. Specifically, courts have failed to recognize
the harms of harassment aimed at women as a group and have failed
to acknowledge harassment premised upon nonsexual behavior. We
base this conclusion on two of our most important findings: first,
plaintiffs alleging individual conduct are more successful than plain-
tiffs alleging group conduct; and second, plaintiffs alleging sexual har-
assment based on comments or behavior of a sexual nature are more
successful than plaintiffs basing their claims on nonsexual, although
sexist, behavior.3 2
I
TnE DATA AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
This study includes a comprehensive analysis of every federal dis-
trict and appellate court opinion on sexual harassment in the employ-
ment context33 for the ten-year period following Meitor Savings Bank,
FSB v. Vinson,34 the first Supreme Court opinion to recognize sexual
harassment as a violation of Title VII.3s Importantly, our period spans
REv. 445 (1997); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 SrT,,. L
REv. 691 (1997); Vicki Schultz, Reconaeptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yu.x LJ. 1683
(1998).
31 Franke, supra note 30, at 691 ("What exactly is wrrong with sexual harassment? Why
is it sex discrimination?").
32 By "nonsexual, although sexist" behavior, we mean less favorable work assignments,
lack of training opportunities, etc.
33 Sexual harassment has been studied in many other nonworkplace contexts. See,
eg., Michelle Adams, Knowing Your Plae Theorizing Sexual Harassment at Home, 40 Amz. L
Rxv. 17 (1998) (discussing sexual harassment of women by men occurring in or around
the home where threat to home exists, such as between a landlord and tenant); C)nthia
Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Gliltoiation of Momen, 106 HArw L RE%,
517 (1993) (addressing the harassment women face while they are traveling or in public
places); Martha Chamallas, The New Gender Panie" Reflections on Sex Scandals and the Militay,
83 Miqex. L REV. 305 (1998) (discussing the problem of sexual harassment and sexual
assault in the military); Maureen 0. Nash, Student on Student Sexual Harassment: If Schoos Are
Liable; What About the Parents?, 31 CRIGTrroN L REv. 1131 (1998) (reviewing current case
law on peer sexual harassment, its implications for schools and the liability of the offend-
ers' parents); Gail Sorenson, Commentary, Peer Sexual Harassment: Remedies and Guiddines
Under Federal Law, 92 EDUC. L REP. 1 (1994) (investigating peer harassment in public
schools); David P. Thompson & A'Lann Truelock, Commentar)y Student-to-Student Sexual
Harassment: Sifting Through the Wrckage 125 EDUC. L RnE. 1035 (1998) (discussing peer-
inflicted sexual harassment, its treatment in federal courts, and the liability of schools
under Title IX).
34 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
35 Id. at 66.
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the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,3 6 which gave plaintiffs
in sexual harassment suits the right to jury trials and compensatory
and punitive damages.3 7 Part of our charge, then, is to detect possible
changes in litigation patterns after 1991.
Our strategy for finding cases was straightforward. We conducted
searches on the federal courts database in Westlaw and Lexis using
the command "sex! w/3 (haras! or harrasl)". Although this broad
search produced many cases that did not involve sexual harassment in
employment, it gave us 502 useable district court opinions and 164
appellate court opinions.38 Of these, only 263 district court cases and
126 appellate cases are officially "published" in the West reporter sys-
tem.3 9 Thus, our database is substantially larger than "published"
opinions as judges use that term. Student research assistants read
each case and filled out a coding sheet of some 106 questions. 40
Our data have certain inherent limitations. First, we reiterate
that we only study cases in which ajudge has written an opinion. This
necessarily excludes the vast majority of sexual harassment situa-
tions.41 As commentators have noted, "most disputes are resolved
without a filing [of a claim]. "42 Most filed cases are settled or
dropped,43 and these are not in our universe of cases. Additionally,
we only include federal cases, even though Title VII claims may be
36 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
37 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b), (c) (1994); see also DAVID CATHCART xr AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS
AcT OF 1991, at 180-81 (1993) (noting that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 authorized compen-
satory and punitive damages originally not authorized under Title VII).
38 The initial search identified cases in which the phrase "sexual harassment" was
mentioned anywhere in the opinion, a list that was more than twice as long as the final
database. Of this larger set, we first determined whether the opinion involved a claim
under Title VII alleging sexual harassment and, if so, whether the opinion provided
enough details to complete the coding sheet. The coding sheet does not allow for the
same suit to be tracked throughout the system. In other words, we coded each opinion
produced in the same suit as a separate case at both the district court and appellate court
level.
39 The proportion of published opinions in our appellate database (110/148, or
74%) is substantially higher than in our district-court database (261/503, or 52%). Be-
cause district court decisions address claims at every stage of the proceeding and many of
their ruling have little precedential value, district courtjudges often choose not to officially
report decisions.
40 The coding sheet for appellate cases contains the same substantive questions as the
coding sheet for district court cases. However, the procedural questions are different.
41 See supra note 9.
42 Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. Ry. 3, 7 (1986)
(citing Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the Adver-
saiy Culture; 15 LAw & Soc'y REy. 525 (1981)); Miller & Sarat, supa, at 543 ("Few dispu-
tants (11.2 percent) report taking their dispute to court.").
43 See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. Ray. 4,
26 (1983) ("Many cases are withdrawn or abandoned.. . ."). Galanter also notes that
"most civil cases in American courts are settled." Id. at 27.
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pursued in state court and many states have enacted their own ver-
sions of Title VII.44 Finally, we only study judicial opinions, which may
not be a random sample of all judicial decisions.4 5
Second, we must recognize our own limitations in interpreting
the cases and turning them into machine-readable, mostly binary vari-
ables. Although some coding error is inevitable when dealing with
large data sets,46 such error is not likely to be a serious source of mis-
interpretation because any error would be random. For example, we
are as likely to miscode a man as a woman and vice versa, and such
errors cancel one another out over enough cases.
The goal was to keep vagaries in interpreting cases to a minimum.
Most legal scholarship-including the best scholarship examining sex-
ual harassment cases-examines the dozen or so leading cases. Schol-
ars interpret and translate the judges' words, trying to assess nuances
of meaning, arguing that the judges implied something while saying
44 See .g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a (West 1995 & Supp. 2000); Kv RE%. STAT.
ArNN. §§ 344.010-.990 (Banks-Baldin 1999); MirN. STAT. Axx. §§ 363.01-.03 (Vest 1991 &
Supp. 2000); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01-99 (Anderson 1998 & Supp. 1999); Tx.
LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 21.001-.306 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000). These human rights statutes
have been identified by their respective state and circuit courts as analogous to their fed-
eral counterpart, Title VII. See Wathen v. Gen. Elec. Co., 1997 FED App. 176P, 115 F.3d
400, 403-04 n.5 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he general purpose of the Kentucky Act is to provide a
means for implementing within the state the policies embodied in Title N11... (and]
substantive legal analysis for the present claims brought under Title VII and the Kentucky
Civil Rights Act is identical."); Brittell v. Dep't of Corr., 717 A.2d 1254, 1264 (Conn. 1998)
(noting that Title VII is the "federal statutory counterpart" to Connecticut's human rights
statute);Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd., 585 N.W.2d 853, 860 (Minn. App. 1998) ("Minnesota
courts have recognized that principles developed in federal Title VII cases are instructive
and may be applied when interpreting [Minnesota's Human Rights Act]."); Ohio Civl
Rights Comm'n v. David Richard Ingram, D.C. Inc., 630 N.E.2d 669, 672 (Ohio 1994)
(analogizing Title VII to Ohio's human rights statute in sexual harassment claims); Graves
v. Komet, 982 S.W.2d 551,554 n.1 (Tex. App. 1998) ("Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code
was enacted for the purpose, among others, of executing the policies of its federal counter-
part, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.. ").
45 See Theodore Eisenberg & StewartJ. Schwab, Mhat Shapes Pecteptions of the Federal
Court SystemP, 56 U. Cm. L Rzv. 501 (1989) (examining different perspectives of the fed-
eral court system arising from published appellate opinions, filed appeals, and district
court filings); Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal Distridct Courts Through Published Cas:s A Ie-
search Note, 15 Jusr. Sis. J. 782 (1992) (concluding that the process of reporting district
court cases makes published cases a questionable sample for social science research be-
cause published district court cases are not representative of a court's entire caseload);
Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, Studying the Icrbreg from Its 77p: A Comparison of
Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 Lmw & Soc'v REv. 1133, 1144
(1990) (cautioning legal analysts that focusing on published opinions alone, w hich re-
present less than fifteen percent of employment discrimination complaints filed, ill yield
skewed results because published and unpublished opinions diverge in systematic and im-
portant ways).
46 We established various controls to limit keypunch and related errors. All cases
were keypunched twice with automatic notification if the repeated case had any different
data. Thus, a keypunch slip would have to occur tice in the same -way for the same varia-
ble in the same case for us not to catch it.
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something else. In addition, the scholarship usually has a heavy nor-
mative approach, criticizing judges when they stray from the appropri-
ate framework or results. By contrast, we try to shift the analysis for
interpreting the individual case to interpreting the range of cases.
The unit of observation is the individual case, but we try to analyze it
in an "objective" manner.
We do this through an approach of "coding" rather than "inter-
preting" cases. The sweep of our variables can be seen from Appendix
A. Typical questions include the following: Did the harassment occur
at work? Is the employer private or government? Did the supervisor
know of the conduct? Did the harassment include touching the vic-
tims? We designed our variables so that sophisticated legal readers of
a case would agree on how it should be coded. One of the method-
ological innovations of the present study is to provide a measure of
"objective questions." For now, we report our conclusion that we are
confident that our variables are "objective" in the sense that well-
trained legal professionals should reach the same answers in most
cases.
An interesting limitation of our data derives from missing obser-
vations in some cases. Our information comes from what the judges
decide to tell us about the cases, and it comes with all the blinders and
biases of the bench job.47 For example, we find that in all cases when
we can identify race, nearly three times as many involve minority
plaintiffs as white plaintiffs. 48 We do not interpret this statistic as sug-
gesting that victims of color are more common than white plaintiffs in
the reported decisions. Rather, we suspect that judges simply do not
mention the race of the victim when she is white.49 It is more salient
47 See Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law Narrative?, 45 BuFF. L. Rxv. 141, 142
(1997) ("Judicial opinions select from among the many facts adduced at trial those 'rele-
vant' to what is deemed to be the case's issue to construct a statement of the case; the
resulting rendition of 'the facts' can thus be seen as a story crafted to support the court's
holding."). Baron and Epstein further note that "[w]ere the issue framed differently, or
were the court to reach a different result, different facts might be selected, and another
story told." Id.; see also Richard K Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT.
L. REv. 681, 684 (1994) ("Increasingly scholars are realizing the inescapability of story-
telling and the diverse ways in which narratives construct what we regard as truth and
reality.").
Storytelling has merit not only within the context of the judicial opinion, but also as it
relates to victims' perceptions of harassment and what constitutes harassment. See Daniel
A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45
STAN. L. REv. 807, 809-10 (1993) (discussing legal storytelling as it applies to critical race
theory and feminist theory and noting that diverse experiences affect the storyteller's per-
ception of the situation, including what constitutes sexual harassment).
48 Of the identifiable district court plaintiffs, forty-five are black, twelve Hispanic,
three Asian, one is Native American, and twenty-one are white. In the courts of appeals, ten
plaintiffs are black, six are Hispanic, and eight are white.
49 We considered the hypothesis that the courts mentioned the plaintiff's race only
because the plaintiff had also brought a race discrimination or racial hostile environment
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when the victim is black, and that makes the judge more likely to re-
port it.5°
The judicial opinion is the judge's story justifying the judgment.
The cynical legal realist might say that the facts the judge chooses to
relate are inherently selective and a biased subset of the actual facts of
the case. This is an overstatement, but it is instructive. For example,
an important issue for us is whether the employer had in place an
antiharassment program, and the degree to which the existence of
such a program affects liability. It is no surprise that when we know
(because the judge reported it) that an employer did not have a pro-
gram, plaintiffs are more successful (71% win rates versus the overall
51%). Correspondingly, in cases where we know (again, because the
judge reported it) that the employer had either a general grievance
program or a specific antiharassment program, plaintiffs are not suc-
cessful (41% and 50% win rates, respectively).51 But in 353 cases we
do not know whether the employers had a formal program. Why
didn't the judge give us this information? The cynic would say that in
some cases the judge decides to rule for the employer, and then has to
write an opinion justifying the decision. If the employer had an an-
tiharassment program in place, this is a fact worth mentioning. If the
employer did not have such a program in place, the judge keeps si-
lent. In cases in which the judge decides to rule for the employee, the
same factors cut in the opposite way in determining whether the judge
mentions the presence or absence of the antiharassment program. It
remains a tricky question whether the presence or absence of an an-
tiharassment program affects the judicial decision or simply is part of
the judicial reporting of the decision in certain cases.
In short, we must be sophisticated and somewhat tentative in the
conclusions we reach. Nevertheless, we are enthusiastic about the
data set and the potential insights it can bring into litigated sexual
harassment cases. With our methodology and its reliance on "objec-
tive" coding, we do not reject issues of interpretation. Rather, we wel-
claim, but we concluded that this is only a partial explanation at best. In the eighty-two
cases that mention the plaintiff's race, only thirty include some type of race or national-
origin discrimination claim.
50 Professor Eskridge, writing about Lon Fuller's famous "judicial" opinions in the
"Speluncean Explorers" case, noted that Fuller never referred to the race of any of the
participants: "[tihere is no explicit due of any sort as to the race of any participant. That is,
itself, an implicit due. In the 1940s, it went without saying that you were white if your race
was not noted." William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Twendteh-
Centuy Statutory Intepreation in aNutshd4 61 GEO. WAsH. L REv. 1731, 1750 n.111 (1993);
see also David L Shapiro, Foreword. A Cave Drawingfor tiw Ages, 112 HARV. L Rxv. 1834, 1835
n.7 (1999) (noting the failure of the hypothetical justices to mention the race of any of the
participants (citing Eskridge, supra)). We suspect that the implication of such silence re-
mains true in the sexual harassment opinions of the 1980s and 1990s.
51 Hereinafter, data reported are reflected in Appendix A unless othenise noted.
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come them. Certainly other commentators may interpret our results
in different ways. Our main objective has been to push issues of inter-
pretation from the usual arena (what does this case mean?) to a
broader one (what does the sweep of cases reveal?).
II
DisTRar COURT RESULTS
A. The Plaintiff
We were not surprised to find that the vast majority of the plain-
tiffs are women. Only 5.4% of the plaintiffs (a total of twenty-seven)
are men, a lower percentage than reported in the Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board study.52 Another nine cases had at least one male plain-
tiff as well as female plaintiffs. Usually these cases involved a husband
joining a state tort claim with his wife's harassment claim. Most of the
victims had left the workplace by the time the lawsuit started.53 How-
ever, 11% of the victims were still employed by the employer at the
time the lawsuit began.
The plaintiffs' marital status also raises issues of selective factual
reporting in judicial opinions. Among the cases where we could ascer-
tain the plaintiff's marital status, we found that 53% of our plaintiffs
were married, 14% were divorced, and 34% were single.5 4 This find-
ing is consistent with the general workforce statistics 5  which indicates
that 58% of the 1997 working labor force was married. The U.S. Merit
Systems Protection Board found, however, that unmarried employees
are more likely to be victims of sexual harassment than are those who
are married.56 One might expect, then, that the proportion of mar-
ried sexual harassment plaintiffs should be less than in the general
52 U.S. MExrr Sys. PROT. BD., supra note 5, at 14 (stating that 37% of women and 14%
of men reported experiencing harassing behavior); see also EEOC REPoRr, supra note 6
(reporting that between 1992 and 1998, men filed between 9.1% and 12.9% of sexual
harassment charges).
53 This finding is generally in line with a 1979 survey which found that 24% of sexual
harassment victims were fired for complaining about the conduct at issue; another 42% left
jobs when they felt harassed. The Impact of Sexual Harassment on the Job: A Profile of the Exper.
ienees of 92 Women, REs. SERms REP. No. 3 (Working Women's Inst.) (1979).
54 These percentages were calculated without including the following categories: "sin-
gle living with boyfriend," "widowed" and "missing/can't tell." Of the 123 participants,
sixty-six were married, eighteen were divorced, and thirty-nine were single.
55 See Current Labor Statistics, MOmHLy LAB. Rxv., Fall 1999, at 87 (indicating that the
U.S. Dept. of Labor Statistics report that 58% of the working labor force was "married with
spouse present" in 1997).
56 See U.S. MERrr Sys. PROT. BD., supra note 5, at 17; see also Becky L. Glass, Workplace
Harassment and the Victimization of Women, 11 WomxEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 55, 59 (1988) (noting
that harassing behavior is more likely to be targeted at women who are younger, never
married, or divorced).
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workforce. 57 A possible explanation lies within the 75% of cases in
which marital status was unascertainable. We suspect that the "actual"
percentage of married victims in our cases is lower than the percent-
age reported because ajudge may find marriage particularly relevant
in discussing a sex harassment case and be more inclined to mention
it than when the person is single.
Somewhat surprisingly, the bulk of the plaintiffs are clerical or
blue collar, rather than workers in higher-status occupations. One
might hypothesize that high-status victims have more resources to
bring a federal lawsuit, and thus professional women should comprise
a higher fraction of all plaintiffs in comparison to their representation
in the workforce. We found, however, that the range of occupations
in our cases tracked the overall workforce quite closely. Where occu-
pation status of the plaintiff could be identified, 12% of the plaintiffs
were professional 58 (as compared to 16% of the workforce), over a
quarter (29%) of the victims were clerical workers (as compared to
29% of the workforce), and 38% of the plaintiffs we could classify
were blue collar (40% of the workforce).*59 Management and white-
collar workers represent 21% of the plaintiffs in the study but entail
15% of the workforce. The occupation of the plaintiff was reported in
90% of the cases, so differential reporting patterns is unlikely to be an
explanation.
B. Representation
We looked to see if public interest groups such as the American
Civil Liberties Union or the National Women's Law Center are in-
volved in these cases. Despite the high media profile of such
groups, 60 less than 2% of the cases had any public interest group in-
volvement. Public interest groups were a party in two district court
cases, represented plaintiffs as counsel in five cases, and participated
as amicus in one other case. In addition, the EEOC was the plaintiff in
57 Fifty-eight percent of the married population won while only 39% of both divorced
and single groups won.
58 These percentages do not include the fifty-two cases where data were missing or
readers could not tell.
59 For the workforce statistics, see Bureau of Labor Household Data Annual Averages
(May 22, 2000) (reporting 1999 data), available at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/
If/AAT9.TXT.
60 See Kirk Mitchell, Woman Claims Private Guards Assaulted Her, DEmmRva Posr, Mar. 2,
1999, at 1B (noting the ACLU's recent lawsuit against the "nation's largest private prisoner-
transport company"); Brenda Rios, NOlVJoins in Bias Battle, Da-raorr FREE PRESS, Mar. 5,
1999, at El (discussing the National Organization for Women's contention that Detroit
Edison fostered a sexually and racially hostile work environment); Jonathon Saltzman,
ACLUHits New Poliiy on Sex Harassment PROVIDFxCEJ.-BuL,,, Oct. 21, 1997, at CI (discuss-
ing the American Civil Liberties Union's opposition to a broad sexual harassment policy
prohibiting all city employees from having any sexually suggestive literature at work).
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only ten cases. 61 Further, in contrast to well-publicized accounts of
class action lawsuits in the media,62 only three of the approximately
61 The EEOC records its participation in lawsuits by statute. Therefore, numbers are
available for the EEOC's participation for all actions brought pursuant to Title VII, a
broader category than sexual harassment suits. In the fiscal year 1992, the EEOC was in-
volved in 242 suits. The EEOC was involved in 260 suits in 1993, 235 in 1994, 193 in 1995,
and 106 in 1996. U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, LITIGATION STATIS'xCS,
FY 1992 THROUGH 'Y 1998, available at http://wwiv.eeoc.gov/stats/litigation.html (last
modified Mar. 1, 2000).
62 See, e.g., EEOC: Women Sexually Harassed at Ford Plants, BosTON GLoBL, Jan. 8, 1999,
at C4 (discussing a lawsuit against Ford and explaining that the "women were called sexu-
ally degrading names, groped, and subjected to explicit graffiti"); David Greising & Ste-
phen Franklin, Complaints Persist at Mitsubishi Plant, Pane4 CHI. Tiu.,Jan. 23, 1999, § 2, at 1
(referring to a $34 million class action settlement won by workers at Mitsubishi plant and
noting that, in spite of the plaintiffs' victory, harassment problems still exist); Bob Kievr,
Hearing Scheduled on Astra SettlemenA WORCESTR TLEGRAM & GAzETTE, Jan. 20, 1999, at El
(discussing $9.8 million settlement of a class action sexual harassment case against Astra
USA); Deborah Peterson & John M. McGuire, Hooters vs. Harassment Charges, ST. Louis
PosT-DISPATCH,July 30, 1993, at IF (discussing a class action suit brought by seven former
Hooters waitresses who alleged a sexually hostile work environment); Stroh Settles Women's
Suit CitingAds, Nrv ORLE.ANs TMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 2, 1993, at C8 (discussing a sexud har-
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five hundred cases involved a class action.63 In fact, our data show
that approximately 90% of cases are brought by an individual female
plaintiff who is not represented by the EEOC or a public interest
group.
C. The Workplace
Where does the harassment occur? Given the very name of the
claim (a hostile "work" environment), it is noteworthy that 114 cases,
or 23% of our total, include allegations of harassment that did not
occur on the employer's premises. Indeed, in sixty-nine cases (14% of
the total), all of the alleged harassment took place outside of the
workplace. Considering the one hundred cases that include a
nonvorksite complaint, about half contain an employment related
event, such as a company party. Thirty cases involve a nonwork social
event, such as private drinks after work.64  However, in thirty-five
cases, the harassment included nonconsensual, off-premises conduct,
such as phone calls, letters, or visits to the victim's home.
One study found that "[v]ictims are more likely than non-victims
to work exclusively or mostly with individuals of the opposite sex."65
Our study finds no support for this statement. The courts mentioned
the sex segregation of the workplace in less than half of the cases
(47%). Of those cases, approximately one-third of the workplaces
were mostly male and approximately two-thirds were mixed male and
female workplaces. Only four district court decisions described the
workplace as mostly female.
D. The Defendants
The majority of cases involved employers in the private sector.6
Only 4% of the cases involved the federal government as defendant,
assment suit filed by eight women against Stroh Brewing Company alleging that the Brew-
ery's ads, and in particular those featuring the "Swedish Bikini Team," fostered a sexually
hostile environment);Jon Tevlin, The Evdekl Mines Cases: Mal PriePain?, Mi.,%,rorous-ST.
PAUL STAR Tam., Nov. 29, 1998, at 1A (discussing "the first [case] in the nation to be
certified as a class-action 'hostile work environment' sexual harassment suit").
63 Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847 (D. Minn. 1993);Jcnson v Eveleth
Taconite Co., 139 F.R.D. 657 (D. Minn. 1991); Sims v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 766
F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Ala. 1990).
64 For an interesting discussion of the regulation of such "associational" rights, see
Terry Morehead Dworkin, It's My Life-Leave Me Alone: Offdhe.Job Emplyce Assedational Pdi-
vacy Rights, 35 Am. Bus. UJ. 47 (1997).
65 U.S. MN.rr S-s. PRoT. BD., supra note 5, at 17. We note that much of the workplace
remains sex-segregated. See Randy P. Albelda, Occupational Sgrgation b.- Race and Gender,
1958-1981, 39 INDus. & L.z. R.. REv. 404, 405-06 (1986) (finding that the "occupational
distributions of all men and women have changed very little when race is held constant").
66 This study does not examine questions concerning the appropriate definition of
"employer" under Title VII. Rather, we limited our description of "employer to include
only private, federal government, or state or local government employers. For a discussion
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and 23% involved a state or local government. If anything, state and
local governments are overrepresented in the cases. Federal employ-
ees comprise only 2% of the workforce, while state and local employ-
ees comprise 13.6%.67
At least one commentator has suggested that coworkers are most
often the perpetrators of sexual harassment.68 In the judicial opin-
ions, however, most harassers are supervisors. 69 Plaintiffs named su-
pervisors or superiors alone as the harassers in 59% of the cases, and
both supervisors and coworkers were named in 20% of the cases.
When the plaintiff named only one harasser, the vast majority (85%)
were supervisors. The selection effect may explain these numbers.
That is, plaintiffs are aware of the lower probability of success when
coworkers are the harassers, and therefore victims of harassment file
suit less frequently when coworkers rather than supervisors are in-
volved. Thus, in the reported and filed cases, most harassers are su-
pervisors. In almost 8% of the cases, we could not determine the
number of harassers involved although 72% of the cases involved har-
assment by one person only. Another 18% involved two to five harass-
ers and one case involved fourteen different harassers.
E. The Claims
Two different sexual harassment claims exist: quid pro quo and
hostile work environment. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
the distinction between these claims, explaining that "[t]o the extent
they illustrate the distinction between cases involving a threat which is
carried out and offensive conduct in general, the terms are rele-
vant."70 The labels do not, however, control the analysis of employer
liability once a finding of discrimination has been made. 71
Quid pro quo harassment involves a grant or denial of economic
benefits following the employee's response to "[u]nwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, [or] other verbal or physical con-
duct of a sexual nature."72 The quintessential example of a quid pro
quo claim is a supervisor's demand of 'sleep with me or I'll fire you.'
To establish a quid pro quo claim, the plaintiff must show that "tangi-
of current issues surrounding the definition of "employer," see Donald F. Kiesling,Jr., Title
VII and the Temporay Employment Relationship, 32 V.A. U. L. REv. 1, 5-9 (1997).
67 BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, REPORT ON THE AMERICAN WoitRmoi=ca 149 tbl.13
(1999) (reporting 1998 data), available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/rtaw/stattab2.htm.
68 Note, Unemployment Compensation Benefits for the Victim of Worh.Related Sexual Harass.
ment 3 HAuv. WOMEN'S LJ. 173, 177 (1980) (noting that most harassers are coworkers of
the plaintiff).
69 See supra notes 9, 41-45 and accompanying text for a discussion of "published" opin-
ions. In our study, 461 cases described the type of harasser.
70 Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753 (1998).
71 Id. at 752; accord Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
72 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2000).
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blejob benefits are conditioned on an employee's submission to con-
duct of a sexual nature and that adverse job consequences result from
the employee's refusal to submit to the conduct."73 Tangiblejob ben-
efits may include transfers, promotions, favorable evaluations, pay
raises, or continued employment.74
A hostile working environment claim arises in situations in which
an employee must endure verbal or physical abuse as part of her em-
ployment. In such a claim, an employee may or may not suffer a loss
ofjob benefits. Conduct that degrades or devalues women or conduct
that would not occur but for the sex of the employee can create a
hostile environment arising out of sex discrimination.", If a supervi-
sor continually pinches or grabs an employee but never hinges a pro-
motion or raise on reciprocity, a quid pro quo claim would not
succeed.7 6 The employee would, however, have a hostile environment
claim .77
The bulk of sex harassment cases involve hostile environment
claims. Almost 70% of the cases only include a hostile environment
claim, while another 22.5% combine a hostile environment claim with
a quid pro quo claim.
Professor Marion Grain has suggested that women in traditionally
female jobs are relatively likely to bring quid pro quo claims, while
women entering male-dominated workplaces are more likely to com-
plain of hostile environment.78 The fact that courts described the
workplace as predominantly female in only four cases complicated
our verification of this part of Professor Crain's theory. However, we
can compare the rate of quid pro cases in male-dominated workplaces
and mixed workplaces. In the eighty-eight mostly-male-workplace
cases, only 17% include a quid pro quo claim and 83% rely solely on
73 Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1414 (10th Cir. 1987).
74 See, e-g., Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d 1044, 1048.49 (3d Cir.
1977) (concluding that Title VII is violated when a supervisor makes sexual ad-ances or
demands toward a subordinate employee and conditions aspects of the employee's career
development on a favorable response to those advances or demands).
75 See Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that re-
peated verbal comments of a sexual and nonsexual nature were properly considered by the
district court); Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1416-17 (holding that nonsexual verbal harassment of a
black female security guard should be considered in a sexual harassment claim); McKinney
v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("We have never held that sexual harassment
... of an employee or group of employees that occurs because of the sex of the employee
must, to be illegal under Title VII, take the form of sexual advances or of other incidents
with dearly sexual overtones."); Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 127881 (D.D.C.
1988) (granting recovery for a hostile environment created by supervisors bestowing pref-
erential treatment on women who submitted to their sexual advances).
76 See Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1413-14.
77 See id. at 1417.
78 Marion Crain, I1omen, Labor Unions, and Hostile IoM Envirownent Sial Haras.ent:
The Untold Story, 4 TEx. J. Wozc.N & L 9, 16-17 (1995).
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hostile environment claims. In the 145 mixed-workplace cases, by
contrast, 34% include quid pro quo claims and only 66% rely solely
on hostile environment claims. Thus, it appears that mostly-male
workplaces tend to generate hostile environment claims, consistent
with Professor Crain's analysis.
Conforming to stereotypes, physical harassment was significantly
more likely in the blue-collar and pink-collar cases than in higher-sta-
tus occupation cases. Nearly half of the blue-collar and clerical cases
(48% and 50%, respectively) contained a complaint of physical harass-
ment, compared to only 32% of the management and 38% of the pro-
fessional cases. In addition, most sex harassment cases, whether quid
pro quo or hostile environment, include other claims as well. In fact,
only 13% of the cases did not include at least one other claim. Almost
20% brought at least four other claims. Six plaintiffs brought nine
other claims.
Of prime interest is the type of conduct at issue in the cases. We
looked for the presence of sixteen categories of sexual harassment
conduct (plus a catch-all "other" category). These categories include
the following: oral and written comments about women in general or
, particular victims; written comments or graffiti; pornography; posters
or pinups; objectionable letters or materials sent to the plaintiff; physi-
cal contact of a sexual nature or a nonsexual nature (such as hitting);
requests for dates; and requests for sexual favors. Table 1 shows the
frequency of these types of conduct. For example, the plaintiff al-
leged that the harassers made sexual comments about her physical
appearance in 48% of the cases and alleged physical sexual contact in
42% of the cases.
By referring to Table 1, we can make the following observations.
The type of harassing conduct differs somewhat by occupational cate-
gory but not in clearly predictable ways. Physical harassment is most
common in white-collar cases, although, due to coding issues, we have
only nineteen white-collar cases involving physical harassment. Re-
quests for dates formed part of harassment complaints somewhat
more often in clerical or management settings than in blue-collar set-
tings. The larger conclusion is that the type of conduct does not differ
dramatically by occupation.
The type of conduct also differs in the segregated workplaces, but
again the differences are modest.
Complaints about requests for dates and requests for sexual fa-
vors were somewhat less frequent in mostly male workplaces than in
mixed workplaces. By contrast, segregation of the workplace did not
affect the proportion of physical harassment complaints.
Some of the more notorious cases involve poster pinups, general
graffiti, or other harassment against women in general, without any
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TABLE 1
SEXuAL HARASSlmNT IN DsmncT COURT CASES
% of district
Number court cases MWin Rate
Plaintiff Specific Conduct 426 84.7 52.8*
Oral comments about Plaintiff
Belittling names (e.g., babe, honey) 98 19.5 59.2*
Physical appearance, sexual comments 244 48.6 57A 0 *
Objectionable letters sent to plaintiff 25 5.0 52.0
Sexual materials left in plaintiffs private space 25 5.0 68.0*
Less favorable treatment in work assignments,
conditions 145 28.9 55.9
Favorable treatment to employees in sexual
relations with supervisors/employers 17 3A 88.2*0n
Requests for dates 100 19.9 53.0
Requests for sexual favors 149 29.7 59.1"'
Physical harassment 224 44.6 59.4"'
Sexual nature (e.g., squeezing, pinching,
grabbing) 210 41.8 59.5*"'
Nonsexual nature (e.g., hitting) 43 8.6 62.8
Conduct Aimed at Women in General
Oral comments about Women in general
Belittling names 60 12.0 58.3
Physical appearance, sexual comments 89 17.7 61.8*'
Pornographic descriptions 42 8A 64.3*
Offensive gestures 27 5.4 51.9
Written comments, like graffiti 34 6.8 70.6"
Posters/pinups in public areas 35 7.0 60.0
*(**) (***) Significant at the 10% (5%) (1%) level
conduct specifically directed against particular employees. These
cases turn out to be quite unusual. Nearly 85% of the cases in our
sample involve allegations of plaintiff-specific conduct. In fact, allega-
tions of posters or pinups occurred in only 7% of the cases. Com-
ments about women in general but not specifically about the plaintiff
were almost never alleged in isolation of other conduct. In fact, we
found only three cases in which the plaintiff premised her entire com-
plaint on sexual comments about women in general.7 9 They all lost.
Paula Jones's sexual harassment suit against President Clinton 80
raised the issue of whether a single incident could constitute sex har-
assment.8' Our data show that single-incident cases are highly unu-
sual. Only 4% of our 502 cases involved a single incident of
harassment. (Tones itself occurred after our time period and is not in
79 Thompson v. Campbell, 845 F. Supp. 665 (D. Minn. 1994); Fair v. Guiding Eyes for
the Blind. Inc, 742 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Krijn v. Pogue Simone Real Estate Co.,
No. 89-Civ.-0829, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9108 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 1989), re'd, 896 F.2d 687
(2d Cir. 1990).
80 Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
81 I. at 675 (failing to find alleged incident constitutes abusive working environment
when viewed under totality of the circumstances).
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the database). The plaintiffs were successful in only seven of these
twenty cases, a significantly lower win rate than in cases complaining
of longer periods of harassment.
F. The Posture of the Case
The district court opinions we examined included many pretrial
opinions, such as summary judgment motions and motions to dismiss.
Twenty-five percent involved memorandum decisions after trial and
the remainder dealt with pretrial motions. Most trials were before a
judge rather than ajury. Recent years have seen a significantly higher
fraction of cases occurring at the dismissal or summary judgment
stage. In the 1986-1989 period, only half of the opinions are in pretrial
cases, while three-quarters of the opinions in the 1990s are at the pre-
trial stage. These results are consistent with the supposition that
judges are increasingly playing a gatekeeper role in sexual harassment
cases by deciding issues on legal rather than factual grounds.82 While
this comports with Justice Holmes's vision that law will become more
rule-oriented as experience in an area increases, 83 it is inconsistent
82 See, e.g., M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environments and SummaryJudg-
ments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 311 (1999) (arguing that courts' tendencies to
decide hostile environment sexual harassment cases prevents juries from participating in
the enforcement of gender antidiscrimination norms).
83 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAv 1-2 (1881).
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with the general trend in modem tort law that allows triers of fact to
decide most legal disputes. Despite the provisions in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 allowing for jury trials, ajury was involved in only twenty-
nine cases. Of those cases, the jury reviewed the sexual harassment
allegations in only half.
THE SuccEassFUL PL~rru~s IN Disrucr COURT
Determining whether a plaintiff has won or lost is not always
easy,8 particularly in pretrial cases. We count the case as a "win" for
the plaintiff if the court upheld the plaintiff's sexual harassment claim
in whole or in part. Many opinions arise from pretrial motions to
dismiss the plaintiff's claim, after which a "winning" plaintiff could
face other motions to dismiss as well as a trial on the merits, post-trial
motions, and an appeal. Winning at an early stage does not necessa-
rily indicate an ultimate victory for the plaintiff, but losing an early
motion typically indicates an ultimate defeat.
In some of our analyses of factors influencing wins, we limit our-
selves to opinions attached to trials. Table 2a summarizes the proce-
84 For an extended discussion of the problems in determining whether a ci il rights
plaintiff is successful, see Theodore Eisenberg & Ste-art Schiab, 77e R aily of Constitu-
tional Tort Litigation, 72 ComRNi. L Rxv. 641 (1987) (reporting empirical data on relative
success, burden, and financial drain on constitutional tort plaintiffs).
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dural posture of the district court cases and shows the success rate at
each stage. Table 2b shows that trials occurred in only a third of the
cases. As would be expected, given the standards for pretrial motions,
plaintiffs had a much higher success rate surviving pretrial motions
than obtaining a favorable final judgment. When a claim did reach
the trial stage, plaintiffs did significantly better before a jury than a
judge.
TABLE 2A
PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF SEX HARASSMENT CASES IN
DIsTRICT COURT CAsES
Number % of cases Win Rate
Pretrial motion on substance of claim 326 64.9 52.5
Pretrial motion on procedure, evidence 19 3.8 79.0
Memorandum order after bench trial 124 24.7 39.5
Motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict 4 0.8 75.0
Posttrial motions 29 5.8 65.5
TABLE 2B
TYPE OF TRILus IN DisTRicr COURT CASES
No trial; decided on pretrial motions 346 68.9 54.1
Bench trial 127 25.3 45.7
Jury trial 11 2.2 54.6
Both bench and jury trial 18 3.6 33.3
Appendix A shows the win rates for every category of case. Not
controlling for other factors and not separating motion opinions from
trial opinions, the successful plaintiff is a woman who alleged conduct
directed specifically at her by both supervisors and coworkers and
complained within the organization in some manner about the con-
duct. As expected, female plaintiffs fared better than male plaintiffs;
however, when both a male and female plaintiff sued, the success rate
was a surprising 89%. Blue-collar and clerical workers were more suc-
cessful than management, white-collar, or professional employees.
Contrary to some suggestions, plaintiffs in sex-segregated workplaces
fared better than those in integrated workplaces.8 5
Understandably, plaintiffs were most successful where both super-
visors and coworkers were the alleged harassers. Moreover, the suc-
cess rates seem to increase as the number of the harassers increase.
However, the number of cases with multiple harassers is fairly small so
that this increase in the success rates is not statistically significant.
85 See Lee, supra note 4, at Al (suggesting that hostile environment claims will be
more difficult to win against defendants in industries historically perceived as tolerating a
higher degree of vulgarity and abuse).
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When a plaintiff alleged that the defendants commented about
her physical appearance or made comments of a sexual nature specifi-
cally to her, she won in 57% of the cases. Further, plaintiffs were
equally successful (59%) in cases wherein they complained of belit-
tling or derogatory comments about them. Physical contact also
seems important: when plaintiffs did not allege physical contact of any
kind, they were successful in only 45% of the cases.
When the plaintiff had not complained within the organization
in some fashion, she lost almost 70% of the time.8 6 However, when
the employer had no formal sexual harassment programs or genera-
lized grievance process which covered sexual harassment, the plaintiff
won 71% of the time. This comports with our finding that an absence
of employer liability is one of three main reasons that courts reject
plaintiffs' claims.
The preceding analysis is superficial in that it ignores the correla-
tion between elements that influence success. For example, the type
of conduct and the type of workplace may jointly affect success. We
therefore turn to multivariate analysis to determine more precisely the
factors affecting wins.
Table 3 reports the results of two logistic regressions explaining
wins. The first regression includes all 502 cases in the district court
database, while the second regression limits itself to 130 usable cases
involving trials.87
The factors strongly helping a plaintiff's case include the follow-
ing: (1) the supervisor knew of the harassment before the victim com-
plained externally; (2) the plaintiff alleged physical harassment; (3)
the case is covered by the Civil Rights Act of 1991; (4) the complaint
comes from a mostly male rather than a mixed workplace; (5) harass-
ment involved supervisors rather than coworkers alone; (6) the plain-
tiff objected to the harassment; and (7) the employer had no general
or sex-harassment-specific grievance procedures in place.
86 One researcher has postulated that women are generally more likely to employ
passive coping strategies that reduce internal stress, such as talking ,ith others and venting
emotions, rather than confronting the harasser or filing a formal report. &e Margaret S.
Stockdale, TheDirect and ModeratingInfluences of Sexual-Harassment Perasiteness, GopingStrat-
egies, and Gender on Work-Rdated Outcome 22 PSycHOL WoMtEN Q. 521, 523 (1998) (noting
that women tend to reserve more confrontational approaches, such as reporting the har-
assment or telling the harasser to stop, for more severe incidents).
87 The odds ratio demonstrates how a particular variable affects the odds. Odds ratios
greater than one increase the odds, meaning that after controlling for the other variables
in the regression, such variables increase the chances of the plaintiff vinning the case;
conversely, odds ratios less than one indicate that the -ariable harms the plaintiffs
chances.
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TABLE a
LOGISTIC REGRESSION SHOWING FACTORS INFLUENCING WINS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES
All District Court Cases
Independent Variables
1991 Civil Rights Act applies
Segregation of Workplace
Omitted reference variable=mostly
male
Workplace mostly female
Workplace mixed
Workplace can't tell segregation
Sex of Plaintiff
Omitted reference variable=male
Plaintiff female
Plaintiff both
Status of Harassers
Omitted reference
variable=supervisors only
Supervisors & coworkers
Coworkers only
Can't Tell status of harassers
Employer's Antiharassment procedure
Omitted reference variable=no
procedure
Employer has antiharassment
procedure
Can't tell if procedure exists
Plaintiff told coworkers of harassment
Plaintiff-specific harassment
Physical harassment
Type of Consent
Omitted reference variable=pl
expressed disapproval
Plaintiff gave no signals
Plaintiff sometimes reacted in kind
Can't tell
Knowledge of Supervisors
Omitted reference variable=no
supervisor knowledge
Supervisor Knew of Harassment
Can't tell whether supervisor knew
Single incident of harassment
Number of observations
Chi
2
Probability > chi
j2
Pseudo R7
Odds Ratio
3.053
3.210
0.789
0.576
1.334
P>Izl
Trials Only.,
Odds Ratio P>Iz
0.005***
0.884
0.086*
0.851
1.080 0.856
5.605 0.141
1.235 0.433
0.455 0.012**
2.068 0.070*
0.402
0.595
2.038
1.532
1.632
0.055*
0.251
0.049**
0.182
0.025**
0.207 0.063*
0.782 0.555
0.995 0.985
4.093
2.823
0.536
502
82.91
0.000
0.119
0.002***
0.022**
0.221
0.471 0.199
0.671 0.517
1.325 0.838
5.648 0.398
1.765 0.288
0.268 0.142
30.789 0.006***
0.128 0.033**
0.107 0.018**
4.385 0.023**
1.234 0.780
1.491 0.426
1.110 0.872
1.576 0.481
1.230 0.751
0.782 0.777
130
36.72
0.002
0.209
IV
APPELLATE COURTS RESULTS
A. Case Characteristics
Most appellants were plaintiffs below. The plaintiff appealed in
74% of the cases, the employer in 18%, and both parties in the re-
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maining 8%. Given that plaintiffs and defendants win about equally
in the district courts, it follows8s that unsuccessful plaintiffs are more
likely to appeal than unsuccessful defendants. Even taking into ac-
count the somewhat lower success rate for plaintiffs in decisions issued
after a trial (40%), plaintiffs are still appealing at a higher rate than
defendants.
As Appendix A shows, the appellate courts confront plaintiffs, de-
fendants, and allegations similar to those before the district courts.
For example, the occupational categories break down along the same
lines as the district court: one-third blue collar, one-third clerical, and
the remainder management or professional. As discussed above, the
similarities of the cases in the trial courts and appellate courts cast
doubt on the belief that blue-collar workers may not have the re-
sources to pursue a lawsuit, much less pursue one through the appeals
stage. The fraction of appellate cases involving harassment only by
coworkers, 15.8%, is strikingly similar to the proportion of coworker-
only cases in the district courts (13%). Slightly more appellate cases
than district cases include a claim of physical harassment (53.1% to
44.6%), but the difference is not statistically significant. In sum, the
appeal filter does not alter the mix of cases very much.
Indeed, the greatest difference between the appellate and district
courts is that the appellate court data are more detailed. As seen in
Appendix A, with a few exceptions the "Missing/Can't tell" percent-
age is higher for district court variables than appellate court variables.
In general, this is because appellate opinions tend to be longer and
richer, and are less likely to discuss procedural issues with little factual
background. Thus, our coders found more data in the appellate
cases.
In most cases, the differences between the appellate and district
court are minor, but the differences in missing data involving em-
ployer antiharassment programs is astounding. When coding whether
or not the employer had an antiharassment program, general griev-
ance procedures, or specific sex-harassment procedures, we could not
tell in 70.3% of the district court cases. For the vast bulk of district
cases, the presence or absence of an employer program was not wor-
thy ofjudicial reporting in the opinion. By contrast, in the appellate
cases, we were unable to answer the question in only 36% of the cases.
In other words, the appellate judge usually gave this information in
the opinion, while the districtjudge did not. Assuming that appellate
88 Our appellate-court and district-court databases are not linked; thus, we cannot
track the same case through the system. Therefore, we do not estimate what factors lead to
an appeal at the individual-case level. However, we can determine at the gross level which
district-court characteristics show up disproportionately on appeal. From this perspective,
it is evident that plaintiffs who lose in district court show up disproportionately on appeal.
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and district cases have the same mix of employers with and without
programs, it appears that when employers do not have such a pro-
gram, district judges fail to mention whether the antiharassment pro-
gram exists. In the appellate data, 28.7% of the employers are known
not to have a program, which is dramatically higher than the 7% of
employers known not to have a program in the district-court database.
On the other side, 35.4% of the employers in the appellate database
are known to have some type of program, which is not substantially
more than the 22.8% of the employers in the district court database
known to have a program.
B. The Success Rates
Both plaintiffs and defendants had difficulty convincing the ap-
pellate courts to reverse the lower courts. When the plaintiff ap-
pealed, she succeeded in only 27% of the cases, while the defendant
also won in 27% of cases. These numbers are similar to other studies
of federal courts of appeals.8 9
As Table 4 shows, the success rate of plaintiffs varies dramatically
by circuit. In the Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits, plaintiffs
won fewer than a third of the appellate cases (twenty-four of eighty-
one), while in the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits col-
lectively, plaintiffs won nearly three-quarters of their cases on appeal
(twenty-five of thirty-four). Similar but more muted differences ob-
tain when the analysis is restricted to officially published opinions.
The Fourth and Sixth Circuits officially publish fewer than half the
opinions they issue, a far lower rate than the other circuits, and seem
to publish a disproportionate number of opinions where plaintiffs
win. Still, these circuits, especially the Fourth, have lower plaintiff suc-
cess rates than other circuits.
The varying success rates at the appellate level do not easily trans-
late into corresponding success rates among district courts in the cir-
cuits. Although the plaintiffs' below average success rate in the
district courts of the Fourth Circuit and the above average success rate
in the district courts of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits correspond to
low and high success rates, respectively, at their appellate levels, there
is no correspondence between district and appellate success rates
within the Second, Sixth, or Seventh Circuits. The most startling sta-
tistic among the district courts may be the huge number of district
court opinions, particularly at the pretrial stage, within the Seventh
Circuit. It turns out that the Northern District of Illinois wrote 102
opinions in sexual harassment cases, over twice as many as the forty-six
89 See Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 45, at 517 (reporting that plaintiffs successfully
appealed 35% of a control group of published, non-civil-rights cases whereas defendants
successfully challenged 33% of these cases).
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TABLE 4
SuccEss RATES OF SEX HARASSMENT PLATIFFs BY CmCurr
DISTRICT COURT APPELLATE COURT
All Cases Cases w/Trials All Cases
Published
Opinions
% PI # of % PI # of % PI # of % P #of
Circuit -ins Cases Wins Cases 'Wins Cases WIns Cases
1st 50.0 20 57.1 7 42.9 7 50.0 6
2d 50.0 62 38.1 21 80.0 5 80.0 5
3d 43.4 53 16.7 18 37.5 8 37.5 8
4th 38.5 39 33.3 12 21.1 19 30.0 10
5th 47.4 19 33.3 6 38.5 13 38.5 13
6th 58.3 24 55.6 9 28.0 25 44.4 9
7th 53.5 116 60.0 20 27.3 33 32.1 28
8th 50.0 30 50.0 18 72.7 11 72.7 11
9th 64.5 31 85.7 7 63.6 11 70.0 10
10th 50.0 64 47.1 17 33.3 24 31.6 19
l1th 62.1 29 53.3 15 85.7 7 83.3 6
D.C. 53.3 15 28.6 7 0.0 1 0.0 1
TOTAL 51.1 502 45.2 157 39.0 164 45.2 126
chi2 = Pr. = chi2 = Pr = chi2 = Pr. = chi2 = Pr =
8.36 0.681 15.94 0.143 24.78 0.010 17.41 0.096
cases from the District of Kansas or the thirty-seven opinions in the
Southern District of New York, the districts with the next most
opinions.
V
TRENDs OVF.R TWE
A- The Civil Rights Act of 1991
The database spans almost ten years of decisions, allowing us to
examine trends over time. The enactment of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 falls in the middle of this ten-year span.90 After much debate
and a presidential veto of an earlier bill, Congress amended Title VII
when it passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. These amendments did
not alter the substantive law of sexual harassment but for the first time
provided for the recovery of punitive and compensatory damages as
well as the right to a jury trial.91 In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the
90 Pub. L No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scauered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
91 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994 &- Supp. IH 1997) (providing for compensatory and puni-
tive damages in Tide VII and ADA cases involving intentional discrimination and making a
jury trial available when such damages are sought).
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Supreme Court held that these provisions did not apply to cases pend-
ing prior to the enactment of the Act.92
Unfortunately, we must remain tentative about the effects of the
1991 Act. Even though we read cases through 1995, the 1991 Civil
Rights Act (CRA) covered only thirty-three cases in our sample. This
reflects the fact that it takes the federal courts a long time to process
cases. Because jury trials occurred in only three of those cases, we can
detect no stampede to juries from the Act.
One-third of the cases under the Act did request punitive dam-
ages, significantly more than the 11% of pre-CRA cases that requested
punitive damages. Three post-CRA plaintiffs received punitive dam-
ages, compared to only 1% of the pre-CRA cases. Thus, the Act's crea-
tion of punitive damages does seem to have an effect.
The CRA may increase the likelihood of monetary damages as
well. Ten post-CRA plaintiffs (30% of our sample) received monetary
damages, compared to only 11% prior to the CRA.
B. Win Rates over Time
Table 5 shows the complex trend in win rates for sexual harass-
ment cases.
TABLE 5
SEX H RAssMEN'r PLAnrFs' Disricr COURT WiN RAas OVER TIME
Year # of Cases % Won
1986 15 40.0
1987 36 38.9
1988 20 40.0
1989 41 43.9
1990 62 51.6
1991 81 59.3
1992 66 54.6
1993 57 57.9
1994 95 48.4
1995 29 55.2
Total 502 cases 51.2
The win rate in 1994 is lower than the immediately preceding years,
consistent with the supposition that Harris signaled a cutback in sexual
harassment claims.93 But the win rate in 1995 is not lower. Overall,
win rates are not lower in the mid-1990s than they were a decade ear-
92 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994).
93 Bradley Golden, Note, Harris v. Forklift: The Supreme Court Takes One Step Fonvard
and Two Steps Back on the Issue of Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 1994 DET. C.L, Rv,
1151; Mary C. Gomez, Note, Sexual Harassment after Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.-Is it
Really Easier to Prove?, 18 NOVA L. REv. 1889 (1994).
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Her. Statistically, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no linear time
trend in win rates.
The lack of a time trend should not be surprising, however, be-
cause it is consistent with most selection-effect models of litigation.94
Suppose, for example, that courts became more receptive to sexual
harassment claims (perhaps reflecting legislative enactments). One
would expect that more plaintiffs would bring claims in response and
that these additional claims would tend to be weaker. The result
could be no change in overall win rates. While the courts might treat
a claim of a given strength more favorably than in earlier years, this
could be counteracted by the increased incentive to bring weaker
claims.
Vi
REcENT IssuEs iN SEXUAL HARASS..Nmr L.v
A. The Conceptualization of Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment in the workplace is actionable only if it meets
Title VII's prohibition on discrimination "because of" sex.95 Although
it is now beyond question that Title VII provides such a cause of ac-
tion, scholars have begun to refocus on the question of why sexual
harassment falls within Title V]1. 96 That is, these scholars seek to de-
termine why sexual harassment is sex discrimination in order to un-
derstand both how to remedy the wrong and what behavior should be
included within the category.97 Below, we briefly discuss the recent
work of four scholars on the "why" of sexual harassment and conclude
that our findings substantiate their conclusions that the courts nar-
rowly construe what constitutes sexual harassment.
Professor Anita Bernstein "examines sexual harassment with an
eye toward remediation, prevention, and other pragmatics."95 She de-
scribes the divisions in the judicial and academic communities over
sexual harassment as "miscommunication" and sexual harassment as
coercion as well as a division as to the role of fault in sexual harass-
ment claims.99 If harassment is a wrong inflicted by one person upon
94 See generally George L Priest & Benjamin Klein, The S&kdion ofDisfittesfor Litigation,
13J. LEmc. STrU. 1 (1984) (presenting empirical data on the selection effect model and its
implications).
95 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k), 2000e-2 (1994 & Supp. m 1997); see Oncale %. Sundmner
Offshore Sens., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (holding that Title VIi's prohibition of discrimina-
tion "because of sex" protects men as well as women).
96 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
97 See Franke, supra note 30, at 691-95.
98 Anita Bernstein, An Old Jurisprudence: Respect in Rdrosped, 83 CoR.,ju. L RE%% 1231,
1232 (1998) [hereinafter Bernstein, An OldJuriprudence]; see Anita Bernstein, Treating &x-
ual Harassment with Resper, 111 Hv. L REv. 445 (1997) [hereinafter Bernstein, Treating).
99 See Bernstein, Treating, supra note 98, at 447-48.
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another then tort remedies should govern. 00 However, Title VII fo-
cuses on the "atmosphere or working conditions rather than fault."' 01
Bernstein reconciles these competing perspectives by describing sex-
ual harassment as a type of incivility or disrespect. 0 2 She further ar-
gues that sexual harassment denies each individual the respect she is
due simply by her status as a person: "Respect in the sense of recogni-
tion [of a person's inherent worth] is owed to all persons, and thus
workplace sexual harassment betrays the ideal of recognition respect
... ."103 Thus, Bernstein recommends use of a "respectful person
standard" in hostile environment cases as "giving content to the ideal
of equality behind Title VII as well as the ideal of individual autonomy
behind dignitary-tort law.'u0 4 In using a respectful person standard,
Bernstein seeks to do more than simply replace one word with an-
other. She argues that "[buy moving the inquiry away from a com-
plainant's reaction and turning it on the conduct of employers, the
switch from 'reasonable' to 'respectful' avoids the victim-blaming that
has marginalized and devalued women workers."' 05
Professor Katherine Franke begins by analyzing the flaws in the
current understanding of sexual harassment through the use of same-
sex harassment cases. She explains that "by looking to the margins of
a doctrine, much can be understood about tensions in the doctrine at
the center." 0 6 She describes the three historic "principal justifica-
tions" for the inclusion of sexual harassment within Title VII's prohi-
bition against discrimination "because of' a person's sex.'0 7 Franke
argues that these justifications fail to account for why sexual harass-
ment is a form of sexual discrimination. Franke asserts that "sexual
harassment is a sexually discriminatory wrong because of the gender
norms it reflects and perpetuates." 08 She describes sexual harass-
ment as a "technology of sexism"-a tool by which sexist goals are
accomplished. 0 9 Franke maintains that sexual harassment "perpetu-
ates, enforces, and polices a set of gender norms that seek to feminize
100 See id. at 448.
101 Id.
102 Id at 450.
103 Id. at 452.
104 Id. at 450.
105 Bernstein, An Old Jurisprudence, supra note 98, at 1234.
106 Katherine M. Franke, Gender, Sex, Agency and Discrimination: A Reply to Professor
Abrams, 83 CoxRNLL L. Rnv. 1245, 1250 (1998). Interestingly, our study seeks to learn
about sexual harassment from the opposite point of view of Professor Franke-by examin-
ing the run of cases (rather than the margin).
107 Franke, supra note 30, at 698-729. The three rationales under which sexual harass-
ment is considered sex discrimination are: (1) because it violates formal equality princl-
ples, id. at 705-14; (2) because it is sexual, id. at 714-25; and (3) because it is sexually
subordinating, id at 725-29.
108 Id. at 693.
109 Id.
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women and masculinize men."" 0 By reconceiving sexual harassment
as an exercise of gendered power, Franke seeks to provide the legal
system with a principled method by which to judge all sexual harass-
ment claims-both "different sex" and same-sex claims."'
In her most recent work, Professor Kathryn Abrams also seeks to
encompass same-sex harassment cases within a conceptualization of
sexual harassment." 2 For Abrams, however, women's subordination
and the dynamics of the workplace must remain at the center of sex-
ual harassment analysis.113 In essence, she conceives of sexual harass-
ment as the institutionalization of women's subordination through
the preservation of male control of the workplace and the reinforce-
ment of masculine norms in the workplace." 4 Ultimately for Abrams,
the wrong of sexual harassment is the "interference with human
agency, and particularly the agency of women."" 5
Abrams suggests that there are many forms of sexual harassment:
There is harassment that secures the work place as a site of male
control versus harassment that secures it as a zone of either male
comfort or masculine normative entrenchment. There is harass-
ment that is directed at women as a group, harassment that is di-
rected at individual women as representatives of a group, and
harassment that is directed at men and women as individuals.116
Abrams argues that by focusing on the subordination of women, each
of the above forms of sexual harassment may be recognized as actiona-
ble. She asserts that "[t]his pluralism [of sexual harassment] is crucial
in propounding an accurate description of a phenomenon that occurs
at the intersection of a variety of oppressive dynamics."" 7
Professor Vicki Schultz also argues that courts and scholars
should increase recognition of nonsexualized behavior as sexual har-
assment."8 She asserts that sexual harassment is a tool used (prima-
rily) by men as a method of undermining women's competence in the
workplace and thereby blocking women from certain jobs." 9 She ar-
110 d. at 696.
111 By conceiving of sexual harassment as a means of feminizing women and masculin-
izing men, Franke's account reaches beyond the workplace to encompass all other fora.
See Franke, supra note 106, at 1248-49 (noting school-based sexual harassment as an
example).
112 Abrams, supra note 30.
113 I& at 1172. In this article, Abrams discusses Bernstein's and Franke's theories and
concludes that Bernstein and Franke have shifted away from a subordination account of
sexual harassment. I.
114 I&
115 I.
116 Id. at 1215.
117 Id. at 1217.
118 See Schultz, supra note 30, at 1689.
119 See U at 1686.87.
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gues that courts have placed too much emphasis on the "sexual" as-
pect of sexual harassment claims. 120 That is, according to Professor
Schultz, courts currently employ a "sexual desire-dominance para-
digm" when judging sexual harassment claims. 121 If the defendant's
conduct is sexual in nature, the courts more readily find a hostile envi-
ronment.122 However, courts often ignore nonsexual conduct such as
inadequate training, name calling, physical contact and abuse, and
less favorable work assignments. 123 Professor Schultz notes that by ig-
noring this type of behavior, courts may be overlooking treatment that
is clearly geared toward discriminating against women because of
sex.124 Schultz accepts and incorporates Franke's theory of gender
conformity and includes non-gender-conforming men among those
whose competence is questioned. 25 Therefore, Schultz argues for a
competence-centered paradigm in which courts focus on whether the
defendant used sexual and/or nonsexual conduct to undermine the
plaintiffs competence, creating a hostile environment because of the
plaintiffs gender. 2 6
Franke and Abrams address the harms of sexual harassment on a
macro level. Although each victim feels the harm as an individual, the
harm arises as a result of that individual's status within a group. In
this way, the subordination of women through the enforcement of
male norms or the exercise of power to enforce those norms is a harm
that affects entire groups. In contrast, Schultz and Bernstein view the
harm of sexual harassment on a micro level-sexual harassment de-
priving the individual of respect or sexual harassment as undermining
an individual's competence. In other words, the harm is experienced
by the individual herself.
Regardless of the perspective from which each scholar views the
harm, each faults the courts for operating under too narrow a view of
sexual harassment. As a positive or descriptive matter, they claim that
courts tend to ignore behavior that "merely" subordinates, disrespects,
enforces gender norms, or attacks the competence of women (and
men). Our findings support this claim. Plaintiffs alleging "harassment
as sexualized behavior"127 have significantly higher win rates than
other sexual harassment plaintiffs. Plaintiffs who alleged harassment
based on comments of a sexual or physical nature were more success-
ful than plaintiffs who alleged comments that devalued women as wo-
120 See ad. at 1689.
121 Id
122 See id.
123 See id. at 1689-90.
124 See id. at 1690-91.
125 See id. at 1691-92.
126 See id. at 1692.
127 See supra Part III.
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men (such as "honey" or "babe").128 Further, harassment claims
premised upon physical contact of a sexual nature met greater success
than physical conduct of a nonsexual nature.1 9
These "less successful" claims are encompassed within the theo-
ries described above. For Bernstein, physical conduct (such as hit-
ting) or belittling, devaluing language surely meets a test of denying
an employee the respect she is due. For Schultz, this behavior is calcu-
lated to undermine the competence of women in the workplace. For
Franke, the belittling names aimed at women reminds women of the
feminine roles they are required to play, while those aimed at men
criticizes them for not attaining masculine goals. In addition, the
physical conduct, even if not of a sexual nature, does the same. In
cross-sex cases, by hitting women, men reinforce the gendered norms
of the male aggressor and the passive female victim. In same-sex
cases, nonsexual physical conduct (such as the "rough housing pre-
sent in Oncale"130) serves to keep men in the physical aggressor mode
while punishing those men who do not play along. Finally, for
Abrams, language devaluing women reminds women of the primacy
of male norms in the workplace while the physical conduct secures
the workplace as a site of male control.
Our findings also support the arguments of Schultz and Abrams
that courts are not including nonphysical, nonsexual harassment
within the scope of sexual harassment. In cases in which plaintiffs
alleged less favorable work assignments, for example, plaintiffi were
significantly less successful than plaintiffs alleging requests for sexual
favors.
Finally, in considering the difference in win rates between allega-
tions involving comments about women in general versus comments
directed at the plaintiff specifically, we see that courts give greater at-
tention to plaintiff-specific conduct.131 When plaintiffs alleged harass-
ment based upon comments of a physical nature made about women
in general, the success rate was a mere 11%. However, when the com-
ments concerned the particular plaintiff and were of a physical na-
ture, the in rate rises to 28%. Although Schultz and Bernstein would
most likely find comments directed at women as a group to constitute
sexual harassment, Franke and Abrams's "macro" perspectives are
more on point. Under Franke's theory, comments about women in
general, not about the particular plaintiff, reinforce the feminization
128 See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text (reporting a 60% success rate for suits
based on allegations of comments of sexual or physical nature).
129 See supra Part III.
130 For example, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Semices, Ina, 523 U.S. 75 (1998), involved
"roughhousing." Id. at 82.
131 See supra Part HI.
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of women (and in the alleged harasser, reinforce the role of men as
sexual aggressor). For Abrams, these comments contribute directly to
subordination of women by reducing women to sexualized beings
rather than employees of equal status.
In sum, our findings support the claim that courts do not recog-
nize all discriminatory behavior that reinforces gender roles and sexu-
alizes women in the workplace. The sweep of court opinions reveals
that courts take most seriously claims of sexual harassment that are
plaintiff-specific and sexually based.
B. The Reasonable Woman Standard
In order to state an actionable claim, the aggrieved party must
allege harassment sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to be considered
both subjectively and objectively hostile or abusive. 3 2 Any such test
immediately begs the question of whose perspective courts should use
to evaluate the allegations most accurately and objectively. Until
1991, the courts used the reasonable person test.
In 1991, the Ninth Circuit articulated a "reasonable woman" stan-
dard to analyze the plaintiff's claim. In Ellison v. Brady,'33 the court
declared, "We... prefer to analyze harassment from the victim's per-
spective."' 34 Under this methodology, the plaintiff can prove a prima
facie case of hostile environment by showing "conduct which a reason-
able woman would consider sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment."135
Two years after Ellison, the Supreme Court in Harris v. Forklift Sys-
tems, Inc. held that in order for sexual harassment to be actionable it
must be perceived objectively by a "reasonable person" to be hostile or
abusive.' 36 Despite the Court's use of the "reasonable person" stan-
dard, it did not explicitly reject the "reasonable woman" test.137 Fol-
lowing Harris, the lower courts split on the question of the
appropriate objective standard.' 3 8 The Ninth Circuit responded by
132 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993).
133 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
134 Id. at 878.
135 Id. at 879.
136 Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.
137 See Mary Anne Weiss, Note, Ninth Circuit Broadens Reasonableness Standard for Hostile
Work Environment Sexual Harassment: Fuller v. City of Oakland, 31 U.S.F. L. REv. 665, 676
(1997) ("The Court mentioned the reasonable person, but it did not hold that such a
standard was required .... Thus, the Court avoided the opportunity to resolve the conflict
between the circuits on the appropriate reasonableness standard.").
138 Compare DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 594 (5th Cir.
1995) ("The test is an objective one, not a standard of offense to a 'reasonable woman."'),
with West v. Phila. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 753 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that the relevant
question is whether "the discrimination would have detrimentally affected a reasonable
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adopting the standard of a "reasonable person with the same funda-
mental characteristics."13 9
Since Ellison, the reasonable woman standard has received much
attention in the academic literature. Many commentators argue that
the use of a "reasonable man" standard is contrary to the intent of
Title VII and that courts should follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit
and adopt the reasonable woman (or reasonable person with the same
fundamental characteristics or reasonable victim) standard. 140 Others
have suggested that such a standard is contrary to the principle of
equality or that it is unfair to hold men to an unclear standard of
behavior.141
person of the same protected class in that position") and Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28
F.3d 1446, 1456 (7th Cir. 1994) (employing a "reasonable woman" standard).
139 Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995). The Ninth Circuit's
standard was intended to represent a compromise between the Flison reasonable woman
standard and the Supreme Court's reasonable person standard. See Crowe v. Wiltel Com-
munications Sys., 103 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1996).
140 See Sarah A. DeCosse, Simply Unbdievable- Reasonable Women and Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassmen 10 LAw & INEQ. 285, 286, 309 (1992) (arguing that the reasonable
woman standard challenges stereotyped roles and permits a broader scope of actionable
claims); Gillian K Hadfield, Rational Women: A Test for Sex-Based Harassment, 83 CAt. L RL%.
1151, 1157 (1995) (advocating the use of a "rational woman" standard); Kim L Kir, The
"Reasonable Woman" Standard in Sexual Harassment Case, 81 I" BJ. 404, 408 (1993) (en-
couraging Illinois courts to adopt the reasonable woman test); RobertJ. Shoop, The Reaso-
able Woman in a Hostile Work Environment 72 EDuc. L REP. 703, 703 (1992) (arguing that
the reasonable woman standard makes the legal system more responsive to women). Com-
mentators have also examined the reasonable woman standard and the Ellhon decision. See
Angela Baker, Comment, The "Reasonable Woman"Standard Under Ellison v. Brady: Implica-
lions for Assessing the Severity of Sexual Harassment and the Adequacy of Emp!oar Respons, 17 J.
CoRP. L 691, 692 (1992) (noting that the Ellison reasonable voman standard allows courts
to examine the difference in social power between women and men); Deborah S. Brenne-
man, Comment, From a Woman's Point of View.: The Use of the Reasonable Wo man Standard in
Sexual Harassment Cases, 60 U. CtN. L REv. 1281, 1305 (1992) (advocating the reasonable
woman standard as a means of neutralizing the divergent perceptions of men and women
regarding appropriate behavior); Jolynn Childers, Note, Is There a Place for a Reasonable
Woman in the Law? A Discussion of Rerent Developments in Hostile Environment Sexual Harass-
ment, 42 Due LJ. 854, 857 (1993) (advocating a reasonable victim standard); Cheryl L
Dragel, Note & Comment, Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment: Should the Ninth Circuit's
'Reasonable Woman" Standard BeAdopted?, 11J.L & Com. 237, 238 (1992) (noting that "'the
reasonable woman standard' appears to ease the burden on female plaintiffs seeking to
establish hostile environment sexual harassment");JeffreyA. Gette, Comment, SexualHar-
assment and the Reasonable Woman Standard. Is It a Viable Solution?, 31 Dt:Q. L REv. 841, 857
(1993) (arguing for the adoption of the reasonable woman test); Deborah B. Goldberg,
Note, The Road to Equality: The Application of the Reasonable Woman Standard in Sexual Harass-
ment Cases, 2 CARnozo WoiEN's LJ. 195, 212 (1995) (advocating adoption of the reasona-
ble woman standard and arguing that the reasonable person standard hurts women).
141 See Robert S. Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, The Lega4 Ethical, and Sodal Implications of the
"Reasonable Woman" Standard in Seutal Harasment Case; 61 FoRDH,t. L REv. 773, 825-27
(1993) (arguing that it is unfair to hold men to a standard that they may be unable to fully
appreciate or understand because they are men); Paul B.Johnson, 77e Reasonable Woman in
Sexual Harassment Law: Progress or Illusion?, 28 WARE FoREsr L. REv. 619, 621 (1993)
("[C] ourts that have embraced the new standard have done so primarily as a declaration of
political faith, not because the standard was of any real iulue."); Kathleen A. Kenealy, Sex-
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In light of such vigorous debate, we read each case to see whether
the courts discussed the reasonableness standard and, if so, whether
the standard was that of the reasonable person, reasonable woman, or
reasonable victim. Interestingly, we found more articles discussing
the reasonable woman standard than courts adopting the standard.
Of all the cases we studied, only twenty-five opinions adopted the rea-
sonable woman standard.
TABLE 6
REASONABLENESS STANDARDS AND WIN RATES OF SEX HARASSMENT
PLAINTIFFS IN DisTRIcT COURT
Plaintiff Plaintiff
Reasonableness Standard Used Loses Wins Total
Reasonable Person 45 36 81
56% 44% 100%
18% 14% 16%
Reasonable Woman 12 13 25
48% 52% 100%
5% 5% 5%
Reasonable Victim 2 2 4
50% 50% 100%
1% 1% 1%
Reasonable Victim with Plaintiff's demographic features 1 0 1
100% 0% 100%
0% 0% 0%
None 185 206 391
47% 53% 100%
76% 80% 78%
245 257 502
49% 51% 100%
100% 100% 100%
First number in box: number of cases
Second number in box: row percentage
Third number in box: column percentage
Pearson ch 2 = 2.8827
Prob - 0.578
Fewer than one quarter of the district court cases mentioned any "rea-
sonable standard" at all, and of those cases, approximately three-
quarters employed the reasonable person standard. The plaintiff's
success rate was slightly higher in cases in which the courts adopted
ual Harassment and the Reasonable Woman Standard, 8 Lm. Lw. 203, 203, 210 (1992) (pro-
posing that the reasonable woman standard is a legal setback for women because it sends
the message that women are inherently unreasonable); Walter Christopher Arbery, Note, A
Step Backward for Equality Principles: The "Reasonable Woman" Standard in Title VII Hostile Wod
Environment Sexual Harassment Claims, 27 GA. L. REv. 503, 552-53 (1993) (rejecting the rea-
sonable woman standard because it does not reflect the idea of shared values between men
and women); Saba Ashraf, Note, The Reasonableness of the "Reasonable Woman" Standard: An
Evaluation of Its Use in Hostile Environment Claims Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 21
HorsrA L. REy. 483, 484 (1992) (arguing that the reasonable woman standard subverts
Title VII because it is "difficult for employers to announce and enforce policies concerning
sexual harassment that conform to a subjective, rather than an objective standard").
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the reasonable woman standard than those in which the courts used
the reasonable person standard. 142 Given how few cases mentioned
the reasonable standard at all, the specific "reasonable" standard used
is not statistically significant in predicting win rates.
Some commentators have suggested that courts are increasingly
adopting the reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment
cases.143 We see no dramatic upward trend, with only a handful of
courts each year using the reasonable woman standard. Our data
show that courts used the standard in 5% of the cases in 1994 and 7%
in 1995, compared to 6% in 1991, 8% in 1992, and 11% in 1993.
Perhaps most interesting is the interplay between the "reasona-
ble" standard used in those cases in which plaintiffs lost. When courts
determined that the conduct complained of was not severe or perva-
sive enough to create a hostile environment, they most often did not
mention any reasonableness standard. However, when they did, they
cited the reasonable person test over 75% of the time. Further, of the
twenty-seven cases in which courts rejected claims on the grounds that
the plaintiff should not reasonably be affected by the conduct, courts
discussed the reasonable person test in eighteen cases and the reason-
able woman standard in a mere three cases. Although the numbers
tell an interesting story, we must once again point out that the volume
of cases using "reasonable" standards is too small to yield any statistical
significance. 4 4
142 See e.g., Bernstein, supra note 30, at 471 (noting that "female plaintiffs have argua-
bly had [greater] success using the reasonable woman standard"); Toni Lester, The Reason-
able Woman Test in Sexual Harassment Law-Mll It Really Mahe a Diffnrtme?, 26 LcD. L REv.
227, 229 (1993) (surmising that female plaintiffi are more likely to prevail under the rea-
sonable woman standard than the reasonable person standard).
143 See Liesa L Bernardin, Note, Does the Reasonable Woman Exist and Does She Have Any
Place in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VIf After Harris, 46 FLt.. L
REv. 291, 322 (1994) (noting that recent decisions suggest that courts may be beginning to
follow the reasonable woman standard); cf. Elizabeth A. Glidden, Note, The Emigence ofthe
Reasonable Woman in Combating Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 77 IowA L RE,. 1825,
1828 (1992) (pointing to the "innovative approach" some courts are using by emplo)ing
the reasonable woman standard).
144 In addition to the "reasonable" standard, we also examined the socalled "social
context standard" set out in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986). In
this case, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs hostile
environment claim in part because the Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiff's "irascible"
personality was a sufficiently nondiscriminatory reason for her discharge. See id. at 615,
618. However, the court acknowledged that "the presence of actionable sexual harassment
would be different depending upon the personality of the plaintiff and the prevailing work
environment." Id. at 620. The "social context" standard takes into account both subjective
and objective factors and it considers the totality of the work environment coupled wvith
the plaintiff's reasonable expectations. Id. at 620. In discussing the "prevailing work envi-
ronment," the Sixth Circuit quoted the district court's opinion ith approval:
Indeed, it cannot seriously be disputed that in some work environments,
humor and language are rough hewn and vulgar. Sexualjokes, sexual con-
versations and girlie magazines may abound. Tile VII was not meant to-
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C. Same-Sex Harassment
In 1998, the Supreme Court held that same-sex harassment is ac-
tionable under Title VII, 145 thereby resolving an issue which had di-
vided the lower courts.146 In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,
the Supreme Court held that Title VII's prohibition of discrimination
"because of ... sex" protects men as well as women.147 Justice Scalia
noted that "nothing in Title VII necessarily bars a claim of discrimina-
tion 'because of... sex' merely because the plaintiff and the defen-
dant... are of the same sex."148 Justice Scalia further reiterated that
Title VII only covers discrimination "because of sex.' 49 That is, "Title
VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the work-
place."'5 0 Rather, the behavior alleged to be sexual harassment must
be shown to have occurred because of the plaintiffs sex.
While same-sex harassment is actionable, the phrase "same-sex
harassment" covers a range of behaviors. Professor Franke suggests
three categories of same-sex harassment. 151 The first category involves
a gay supervisor who seeks sexual favors from or creates a sexually
hostile environment for his male subordinates. 5 2 The second cate-
or can-change this.... But it is quite different to claim that Title VII was
designed to bring about a magical transformation in the social mores of
American workers.
Id. at 620-21.
A year later, the Sixth Circuit in Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987), held
that the plaintiff Tailed to demonstrate that she had suffered any "adverse employment
action" because she continued to receive the same salary and benefits that she had re-
ceived before she filed her sexual harassment charge. Id. at 638. In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Sixth Circuit applied and espoused a reasonable woman standard for female
victims, id. at 637, thereby limiting the Rabidue "social context standard." Interestingly, de-
spite this subsequent limitation, the "social context" standard was mentioned in ten cases
(or 2% of the cases in our study).
145 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998).
146 See Ervin Chemerinsky, Defining Sexual Harassment, TRL%, May 1998, at 86 (discuss-
ing the Oncale decision); Richard F. Storrow, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment Claims After On-
cale: Defining the Boundaries of Actionable Conduc4 47 Am. U. L. REv. 677, 678 (1998)
(discussing what constitutes same-sex harassment in federal courts); Deborah Zalesne,
When Men Harass Men: Is It Sexual Harassment, 7 TEMp. POL. & Cirv. R'rs. L. Plv. 395 (1998)
(discussing the interpretation of "sex" under Title VII and whether courts have been will-
ing to read Title VII to protect workers from same-gender sexual harassment); Linda K
Davis, Note & Comment, When Is Same-Gender Sexual Harassment Actionable Under Title T7I?
Fredette v. BVP Management Associates, 22 NovA L. REV. 559, 559 (1998) (noting the
controversy in federal circuit courts over whether same-sex harassment is actionable); Co-
rey Taylor, Comment, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Under Title V. The Legal
Dilemma and the Tenth Circuit Solution, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 305, 305 (1998) (observing a split
in the federal courts that have evaluated same-sex harassment claims).
147 Oncale 523 U.S. at 78.
148 Id. at 79.
149 Id. at 79-80.
150 Id at 80.
151 Franke, supra note 30, at 696-98.
152 Id. at 696-97.
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gory includes a heterosexual defendant who exhibits sexual behavior
in the workplace in a manner which another male employee regards
as offensive.1 53 In this second set of cases, "the harasser engages in
sexual behavior that is designed to or has the effect of making the
plaintiff annoyed, uncomfortable... or otherwise victimized by the
defendant's conduct."15 4 Oncale falls within this second category.'55
The third category encompasses "nongay hostile environment cases
where a man in the workplace is targeted for harassment of a sexual
nature because he fails to conform to hetero-masculine norms" and is
undertaken because of the plaintiff's gender identity.158
We analyzed those cases with a male plaintiff to determine the
breakdown between cases in which a male supervisor engaged in sexu-
ally based behavior, a female supervisor engaged in sexually based be-
havior, and those in which Oncale "non-conforming" behavior was
present. Of the twenty-three cases in which we could categorize the
behavior, eleven involved a male supervisor engaging in sexually-
based behavior (the first category described by Franke). The remain-
ing twelve were split evenly between a female harasser engaging in
sexually-based activity and one or more male harassers engaging in
"category two," Oncale behavior.
TAB 7
DisRICT COURT CAsEs wrri-r MAILE Vicm is BY T E OF
SEXUALLY-HARASSING BEHAVIOR
Type of Harassing Behavior Male Plaintiff Loses Male Plaintifflins Total
Male Supervisor, sexually based 6 5 11
Female Supervisor, sexually based 3 3 6
Male "nonconforming" behavior 6 0 6
Total 15 8 23
Pearson chi-2 (2) = 9.8795 Pr = 0.043
As Table 7 shows, complaints brought by male victims against hetero-
sexual harassers have been uniformly unsuccessful. By contrast, male
victims complaining of sexual harassment by either female harassers
or male homosexual harassers have been just as successful as female
153 Id. at 697-98.
154 Id.
155 The plaintiff, Oncale, alleged that while employed on an offshore oil drilling rig,
male employees subjected him to sexual abuse. Oncale alleged that the harassing actions
included the following- two employees restrained him while a third employee placed his
penis on Oncale's neck on one occasion and on Oncale's arm on another occasion; em-
ployees threatened him with homosexual rape; and, employees used force to push a bar of
soap into Oncale's anus. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118, 118
(5th Cir. 1996).
156 Franke, supra note 30, at 766.
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victims. Despite the small numbers, the differences are significant at
the 5% level of significance. Given the gruesome physical attack in
Oncale, the leading same-sex harassment case, it is perhaps surprising
that overall male-victim cases are no more likely to involve physical
harassment. Only eleven of the twenty-seven male-victim cases (41%)
involved such harassment, compared to 44% of the cases with female
plaintiffs.
D. Title VII and the First Amendment
Another subset of the recent literature concerning sexual harass-
ment focuses on the interplay between Title VII and the First Amend-
ment. 5 7 Two court decisions have spawned much of this debate. In
157 See, e.g., Stacyj. Cooper, Sexual Harassment and the Swedish Bikini Team: A Reevalua.
tion of the "Hostile Environment" Doctrine, 26 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. Paos, 387, 420-34 (1993)
(arguing that court's invocation of the First Amendment to protect offensive speech over-
looks women's compelling interest in the workplace and in society); Deborah Epstein, Free
Speech at Work: Verbal Harassment as Gender-Based Discriminatory (Mis)Treatment, 85 GEo. Lj.
649, 649-51 (1997) (arguing that anti-discrimination law withstands First Amendment scrt-
tiny); Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Probhm of Discrimina-
tory Harassmen4 75 TEx. L. REv. 687, 688 (1997) (questioning whether Title VII
unconstitutionally restricts employees' freedom of speech); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual
Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment Dog that Didn't Bark, 1994 Sul. Cr.
REv. 1, 1 (describing the Supreme Court's failure to discuss the First Amendment in Harris
as "somewhat surprising" in light of the increased publicity about collisions between
speech and equality interests); Linda E. Fisher, A Communitaian Compromise on Speech Codes:
Restraining the Hostile Environment Concept, 44 CAmH. U. L. REv. 97, 98 (1994) (arguing that
"hostile environment" is a vague term in speech codes); Gary Goodpaster, Equality and Free
Speech: The Case Against Substantive Equality, 82 IoWA L. REv. 645, 646-47 (1997) (discussing
whether efforts at creating substantive equality by restricting racially or sexually discrimina-
tory speech violates the First Amendment); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Workplace Har-
assment and the First Amendment: A Reply to Professor Volokh, 17 BERRELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 321,
321-22 (1996) (defending sexual harassment law as not conflicting with free speech
rights); Ellen i Peirce, Reconciling Sexual Harassment Sanctions and Free Speech Rights in the
Workplace; 4 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 127, 128-29 (1997) (examining the conflict between First
Amendment rights and sexual harassment law); Wayne L. Robbins, When Two Liberal Values
Collide in an Era of "Political Correctness": First Amendment Protection as a Check on Speech-Based
Title VII Hostile Environment Claims, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 789 (1995) (advocating that Title VII
should not restrict political speech); Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile
Environment Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in Sight, 47 RuTGERs L.
Rev. 461, 465 (1995) (arguing that First Amendment analysis can properly address Title
VII hostile environment issues); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Workplace Sexual Harassment
and Upholding the First Amendment-Avoiding a Collision, 37 ViL. L. REv. 757, 757-58 (1992)
(arguing that broader regulation undermines women's equality); Eugene Volokh, Com-
ment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassmen 39 UCLA L. REv. 1791 (1992) (suggesting
that Title VII is a valid time, place, and manner restriction); Eugene Volokh, Thinking
Ahead About Freedom of Speech and Hostile Vork Environment Harassment, 17 BERXLEYJ. ENSV. &
LkB. L. 305 (1996) (asserting that hostile work environment law is too broad and restricts
constitutionally protected speech); see also Peggy E. Bruggman, Note, Beyond Pinups: Work-
place Restrictions on the Private Consumption of Pornography, 23 HAs-rNiS CONsT. L.Q 271, 273
(1995) (arguing that "the government as an employer may restrict even private consump-
tion of pornography for the purpose of ridding the workplace of discrimination"); Michael
E. Collins, Comment, Pin-ups in the Workplace-Balancing Title VII Mandates with the Right of
Free Speech, 23 CUMB. L. REv. 629, 629-30 (1992-1993) (proposing an obscenity test instead
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Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,158 the court held that pinups and
pornography displayed in the workplace violated Title VII: "pictures
and verbal harassment are not protected speech because they act as
discriminatory conduct in the form of a hostile work environment."5 9
In 1992, the Supreme Court handed down a significant decision,
striking down a St. Paul, Minnesota ordinance prohibiting bias-moti-
vated disorderly conduct as facially invalid under the First Amend-
ment 160 The majority opinion distinguished the prohibitions of Title
VII as resting within the bounds of the First Amendment because Title
VII covers only "sexually derogatory 'fighting words.'" 161 However, in
his concurrence, Justice White applied the majority opinion's analysis
to Title VII and concluded that "[u]nder the general rule the Court
applies in this case, Title VII hostile work environment claims would
suddenly be unconstitutional." 62
The litany of articles and comments these decisions generated ad-
dress two categories of expression: nonverbal expression, such as pos-
ters, pinups, or graffiti; and verbal (oral) expression. As discussed
above, our data demonstrate that allegations falling into the first cate-
gory are rare. Plaintiffs alleged written comments or graffiti in only
6.8% of the cases and posters or pinups in 7%. In fact, only one case
in our database involves allegations of pornography and graffiti in the
absence of any other conduct, and the plaintiff lost. Often lost in the
debate surrounding Jacksonville Shipyards is the fact that the plaintiff
was the target of personal comments as well as denigrating comments
about women in general. When plaintiffs allege pornography or graf-
fiti in addition to other conduct, they are successful a remarkable 80%
of the time.
E. Employer Liability
Employer liability has long held an important place in sexual har-
assment cases. In fact, it is one of the three most commonly cited
reasons by courts for finding that a plaintiff has not proven her
of Title VII to address the issue of pinups in the workplace); Aia 0. Wertheimer, Note,
The First Amendment Distinction Between Conduct and Content" A Conceptual Frarmewarrk for Under-
standingFighting WordsJurispudence 63 FoDINt L REv. 793, 848 (1994) (discussing Title
VII and "fighting words").
158 760 F. Supp. 1486 (MLD. Fla. 1991).
159 Id. at 1535; see also Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Enironment
Harassment and the First AmendmenA 52 OHIO ST. LJ. 481, 495 (1991) (citing Jacsonville
Shipyards as the first decision to impose liability solely on the basis of arguably protected
expression).
160 RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
161 Id. at 389.
162 Id. at 409 (WhiteJ., concurring).
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case. 163 Until recently, and primarily as a result of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Meritor,14 employer liability for sexual harassment
has remained the subject of much scholarly discussion 165 and judicial
variance. 66 Following Menitor, the lower courts unanimously agreed
that an employer was vicariously liable when a plaintiff demonstrated
a cognizable quid pro quo claim. 167 However, courts have less success-
163 The other two are that the conduct was not severe or pervasive and that the court
either did not credit the plaintiff's allegations or there was insufficient support for the
plaintiff's allegations.
164 Meritor Say. Bank FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1985) (holding that severe and
pervasive sexual harassment that alters employee's conditions of employment is actionable
under Title VII).
165 See Joseph G. Allegretti, Sexual Harassment by Nonemployees: The Limits of Employer
Liability, 9 EMPLOYEE Rn. LJ. 98 (1983) (discussing employer liability); Maria M. Carrillo,
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment by a Supervisor Under Title VII Reassessment of Employer
Liability inLight of the CivilRightsAct of1991, 24 COLuM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 41, 41-42 (1992-
1993) (arguing for vicarious liability for supervisors); Cynthia Fryer Cohen & Joyce P.
Vincelette, Notice, Remedy, and Employer Liabilityfor Sexual Harassment, 35 LA. L.J. 301, 301
(1984) (discussing employer liability for sexual harassment under EEOC guidelines);
Sheryl A. Greene, Reevaluation of Title VII Abusive Environment Claims After Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 13 T. MARsHALL L. REv. 29, 29-31 (1988) (discussing the standard for
employer liability after the Court's decision in Meritor); Mark McLaughlin Hager, Harass-
ment as a Tort: Why Title VII Hostile Environment Liability Should Be Curtailed, 30 CONN. L. REv.
375 (1998) (advocating curtailment of employer liability for sexual overtures by cowork-
ers); Kiesling, supra note 66, at 1, 1-2 (discussing the liability of "on-site" employers for
claims of a temporary employee under Title VII); DavidJ. Burge, Note, Employment Discrimi-
nation-DefiningEmployer's Liability Under Title VIlfor On-the-Job Sexual Harassment: Adoption of
a Bifurcated Standard, 62 N.C. I REv. 795, 795-97 (1984) (discussing the standards for de-
termining employer liability); Nancy Fisher Chudacoff, Significant Development, New
EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment Under
Title VII, 61 B.U. L. REv. 535 (1981) (explaining employer liability guidelines under
EEOC); MatthewJ. Cleveland, Comment, Title VII and Negative Job References: Employees Find
Safe Harbor in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 31 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 521 (1998) (discussing
employer liability for negative job references); Lucy B. Longstreth, Note, Hostile Environ-
ment Sexual Harassment: A Wrong Without a Remedy?-Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 21
SuFFoLK U. L. REV. 811, 811 (1987) (same); Christine 0. Merriman & Cora G. Yang, Note,
Employer Liability for Coworker Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 83, 83-86 (1984-1985) (discussing coworker sexual harassment and advocating for
change so that victims are able to obtain judicial remedies); Michael D. hay, Comment,
The Harms of Asking. Towards a Comprehensive Treatment of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. Cm. L.
REV. 328, 328-33 (1988) (discussing the history of sexual harassment as it has been recog-
nized and defined by the courts).
166 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 785-86 (1998) (noting the confu-
sion caused by Meritor); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751-54 (1998)
(same). See generally Graham Penn, Comment, "Because I'm the Boss:" Employer Liability for
Supervisors' Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 51 FLA. L. REv. 373 (1998) (praising the
Supreme Court's decision in Faragher for eliminating the confusion caused by Meritor by
providing a clear rule for determining employer liability for all Title VII sexual harassment
claims).
167 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 790-91.
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fully agreed upon a rule for determining employer liability for an oth-
envise actionable hostile environment cdaim. 10
This confusion in the lower courts may account for the high num-
ber of cases that turn on the question of employer liability. Our study
shows that when an employer has a program that allows victims to
report sexual harassment, plaintiffs are successful barely one-third of
the time, far less than in other cases. Further, where a plaintiff has not
reported the harassment to a supervisor, either formally or informally,
plaintiffs lose 76% of the time. Thus, prior to the Court's decisions in
Faragher and Ellerth, the plaintiff's steps to report alleged harassment
and the existence of an employer program were paramount.
In 1998, the Supreme Court issued two important decisions on
the same day. These decisions identified the circumstances under
which an employer may be held liable for the acts of a supervisor
whose sexual harassment of subordinates had created a hostile work
environment.169 In both cases, petitioners alleged that a pattern of
sexual harassment by supervisors created a sexually hostile working
environment. The Court based its determination of employer liability
on agency law;170 holding that "[a]n employer is subject to vicarious
liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environ-
ment created by a supervisor."171
The Court simultaneously created an affirmative defense for hos-
tile environment cases:
The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the em-
ployer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
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In view of our finding of the importance of an employer program
and a plaintiff's reporting of the alleged harassment, the Ellerth and
Faragher decisions will not significantly vary plaintiff success rates. In
fact, the two elements of the new Faragher affirmative defense were
already critical to the success or failure of a sexual harassment claim.
CONCLUSION
Our method tried to objectively code all cases in a single area of
law-in this case, federal employment sexual harassment law. We
then examined the overall characteristics of the cases, using what we
have called the "sweep" of cases. This method differs from the stan-
dard legal methodology used in teaching and scholarship, which in-
tensively examines the judicial reasoning in the leading appellate
cases, many of which are admittedly atypical. The disadvantage of the
traditional approach is that it disproportionately focuses on marginal
cases at the expense of the run-of-the-mill cases. This may assist law-
yers in handling cases at the margin, but does not help them with the
typical case. Our method extensively examines the bulk of cases.
This method can jar traditional sensibilities, and lawyers are al-
most instinctively suspicious of its findings (unless they accord with
prior beliefs, in which case the method is boring). In some respects,
our sweeping empirical approach is like some of the newer multidis-
ciplinary approaches to the law, such as law and economics, psychol-
ogy, and sociology. These approaches are controversial in part
because they also tend to examine more cases less thoroughly and,
hence, also run up against the law's normal methodologies. In our
teaching and scholarship, we engage in a fair amount of what we Eire
calling "traditional" scholarship. Certainly we do not want to discredit
that enterprise. But we believe that examination of the sweep of cases
will provide useful antidotes to the tendency to generalize too far
from a handful of cases.
What does our study show? Like all empirical studies, many of the
findings confirm common sense or folk wisdom in the area. Others
are more surprising. Still others, we suspect, will elicit both reactions.
After reviewing our study, readers who have had no previous exposure
to a particular finding might be able to explain and incorporate such
findings into their own conceptions of reality.
Our study examines the sweep of sexual harassment opinions in
the federal courts. It is not a study of sexual harassment in the work-
place, nor is it a study of leading cases. Rather, it explores the body of
sexual harassment claims with which judges wrestle, from which they
form their world views, and upon which they develop the doctrine of
sexual harassment law.
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We find that a disproportionate number of plaintiffs are blue-col-
lar or clerical. Most work harassment occurs at work, but 20% of the
cases include claims of off-work harassment. Many more cases involve
mixed workplaces than mostly-male workplaces (and only a tiny hand-
ful of cases involve mostly-female workplaces). Most defendants are
private employers, but a disproportionately high percentage of cases
involve government employers. Almost 80% of the cases involved har-
assment by supervisors in whole or in part, while only 135% limited
their complaint to co-worker harassment.
Most cases (70%) involve solely a hostile environment claim, and
a substantial number (22.5%) combine hostile environment and quid
pro quo claims. Mostly-male workplaces tend to generate a dispropor-
tionate number of hostile environment claims while mixed workplaces
have relatively more quid pro quo claims. Blue-collar cases have a
higher proportion of physical harassment claims than do cases from
other settings. In cases where we could identify the duration of the
harassment, 44% involved harassment occurring for longer than a
year. Only 4% of the cases involved a single incident.
Successful cases are likely to involve sexualized conduct directed
at individual victims. Sexual harassment claims involving differential
but nonsexual conduct and conduct demeaning to women in general
are far less successful. Male victims comprise less than 6% of the
cases, and their cases are significantly less successful than cases
brought by female victims. Furthermore, complaints from mostly-
male workplaces tend to be more successful than those from mixed
workplaces. Two critical factors for a successful case are: (1) that the
victim complained within the organization in some fashion, and (2)
that the employer had established no formal process to deal with sex-
ual harassment issues. Thus, the prior case law had anticipated the
1998 Supreme Court case that articulated these factors as critical com-
ponents in a sexual harassment defense.173
173 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
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APPENDIX A
BASIC DATA ON SEX HARASSMENT OPINIONS
= significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% confidence level
PI = Plaintiff
District Court Appellate
Opinions OpinionsVariable
All Cases
Publication
Published in official reporters
Order not published; on line
Not published; on line
Missing/Can't tell
Public Interest Group Involved in Case
Type of Case
Quid Pro Quo only
Hostile Environment only
Both
Other/Missing/Can't tell
Site of Harassment
On work Premises
Off premises, work-related event
Off premises, consensual social
event
Off premises, nonconsensual
P1's Tenure at Employer
Less than 6 months
6-12 months
1-3 years
More than 3 years
Missing/Can't tell
Employment Status of P1
Not employed when EEOC charges
filed
Employed for EEOC charges, not
lawsuit
Employed when lawsuit began
Missing/Can't tell
Occupation of PI
Blue Collar
Clerical
Management
Professional
White Collar
Missing/Can't tell
Segregation of Workplace
Mostly male
Mostly female
Mixed
Missing/Can't tell
Race of PI
White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Native American
Multiple plaintiffi/races
Missing/Can't tell
PI Win
Number % Rate
502 100% 51.2%
263 52.4 56.7
36 7.2 50.0
163 32.5 42.3
40 8.0 52.5
8 1.6 75.0
22 4.4 72.7
347 69.1 51.3
113 22.5 46.0
20 4.0 55.0
PI Win
N % Rate
164 100% 39.0
**
126 76.8 45.2
32 19.5 18.8
6 3.7 16.7
2 1.2
7 4.3
129 78.7
27 16.5
1 0.6
433 86.3 50.1 151 92.1 41.1*
49 9.8 49.0 20 12.2 50.0
30 6.0
35 7.0
44 8.8
44 8.8
101 20.1
190 37.9
123 24.5
314 62.6
47 9.4
53 10.6
88 17.5
171 34.1
131 26.1
71 14.1
56 11.2
21 4.2
52 10.4
88 17.5
4 0.8
145 28.9
265 52.8
21 4.2
45 9.0
12 2.4
3 0.6
1 0.2
5 1.0
415 82.7
13 7.9
15 9.2
9 5.5
18 11.0
37 22.6
65 39.6
35 21.3
70 42.7
16 9.8
22 13.4
56 34.2
54 32.9
54 32.9
24 14.6
19 11.6
4 2.4
9 5,5
59.1 24 14.6
50.0 1 0.6
43.5 79 48.2
52.8 60 36.6
8 4.9
10 6.1
6 3.7
23.1
60.0*
44.4
44.4
51.4
38.5
22.9
44.3
25.0
36.4
37.5
44.4
40.7
41.7
31.6
50.0
0
50.0
0
40.5
33.3
25.0
20.0
50.0
1 1 100
139 84.8 40.3
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District Court Appellate
Variable Opinions Opinions
PI Vin P1 vin
Number % Rate N % Rate
Sex of Plaintiff
Male 27 5.4 44.4 7 4.3 14.3
Female 464 92.4 50.9 152 92.7 39.5
Both (at least 1 Male & 1 Female) 9 1.8 88.9 5 3.1 60.0
issing/Can't Tell 2 0.4 50.0
Sexual Orientation of P1
Gay 6 1.2 16.7 1 0.6 0
Straight 124 24.7 51.6 51 31.1 47.1
fissing/Can't tell 372 74.1 51.6 112 63.3 35.7
Marital Status of PI
Married 66 13.2 57.6 23 14.0 47.8
Divorced 17 3.4 41.2 4 2.4 50.0
Single 40 8.0 37.5 10 6.1 50.0
Single living w/ boyfriend 1 0.2 100.0 2 1.2 0
Widowed 1 0.2 100.0 0
Missing/Can't Tell 377 75.1 51.7 125 76.2 36.8
Relationship of PI to someone at work
No relationship 152 30.3 54.0 73 44.5 43.0
Yes, w/harasser 27 5.4 48.2 10 6.1 30.0
Yes, w/someone else 15 3.0 33.3 7 4.3 42.9
Missing/Can't tell 308 61.4 51.0 74 45.1 31.1
Type of Employer
Private 367 73.1 50.7 106 64.6 41.5
Federal Government 20 4.0 45.0 11 6.7 27.3
State or Local Government 115 22.9 53.9 47 28.7 36.2
Consent of P1 0**
P1 never went along/expressed dis-
approval 331 65.9 54.4 115 70.1 49.6
PI gave no signals one way or other 14 2.8 14.3 3 1.8 33.3
PI sometimes reacted in kind 31 6.2 45.2 10 6.1 10.0
Mfssing/Can't tell 126 25.1 48.4 36 22.0 13.9
Type of Harasser
Supervisors or superiors only 294 58.6 50.7 98 59.8 39.8
Supervisors and coworkers 99 19.7 57.6 30 18.3 50.0
Coworkers only 67 13.4 35.8 29 17.7 27.6
Missing/Can't tell 42 8.4 64.3 7 4.3 28.6
Length of Harassment 0*,
Single Incident (One day) 20 4.0 35.0 5 3.1 0
Less than 6 months 111 22.1 49.6 38 23.2 31.6
6-12 months 75 14.9 50.7 43 26.2 39.5
More than 1 year 161 32.1 54.7 53 32.3 58.5
issing/Can't tell 135 26.9 51.1 25 15.2 16.0
Victim Complained Internally 0
No internal complaint 57 11.4 29.8 30 18.3 23.3
Yes, victim complained internally 316 63.0 54.1 100 61.0 45.0
Missing/Can't tell 129 25.7 53.5 34 20.7 35.3
Employer Antiharassment Programs
No program 35 7.0 71.4 47 28.7 48.9
General grievance procedures 54 10.8 40.7 38 23.2 29.0
Specific sex-harassment procedures 60 12.0 50.0 20 12.2 40.0
Missing/Can't tell 353 70.3 51.0 59 36.0 37.3
Supervisor Knowledge of Harassment
None before victim files extrnl chg 41 8.2 19.5 20 12.2 15.0
Yes, supervisor knew of harassment 291 58.0 56.7 109 66.5 45.9
Missing/Can't tell 170 33.9 49.4 35 21.3 31.4
Steps P1 took in Reporting Claim:
Told coworkers about harassment 49 9.8 65.3** 29 17.7 65.50*
Told outside friends 18 3.6 66.7 7 4.3 42.9
Told supervisor informally 210 41.8 57.1* 82 50.0 48.8*
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Variable
Complained formally
Someone else complained on P1's
behalf
Jury involved in case
No jury involvement
Jury involvement
Missing/Can't tell
Jury involved in Sex Harassment Claim
No jury involvement
Jury involvement
Missing/Can't tell
Request for Punitive Damages
No request made
Pl. Requests punitives
Missing/Can't tell
Reasonable Standard Used by Court
Reasonable Person
Reasonable Woman
Reasonable Victim
Reasonable Victim w/Pl's Features
Missing/Can't tell
Social Context Standard Used by
Court
Yes, Standard Used
No, Standard Rejected
None Mentioned
Missing/Can't Tell
Types of Sexual Harassment:
Oral comments about P: belittling
names (e.g., babe, honey)
Oral comments about women in
general: belittling names
Oral comments about PI: physical
appearance, sexual comments
Oral comments about women in
general; phys appearance, sex
comments
Pornographic descriptions
Offensive gestures
Written comments, like graffiti
Objectionable letters sent to P1
Posters/pinups in public areas
Sexual materials left in P1's private
space; e.g., desk, locker
Physical contact of sexual nature;
e.g., squeezing, pinching,
grabbing
Physical contact of nonsexual
nature; e.g., hitting
Less favorable treatment in work
assignments, conditions
Favorable treatment to employees in
sexual relations with super-
visors/employers
Requests for dates
Requests for sexual favors
Grouped types of sexual harassment:
Plaintiff specific allegations
Physical harassment
Number
233
9
District Court
Opinions
PI Win
% Rate
46.4 56.2**
1.8 22.2*
457 91.0
32 6.4
13 2.6
470 93.6
16 3.2
16 3.2
157 31.3
63 12.6
282 56.2
81 16.1
25 5.0
4 0.8
1 0.2
391 77.9
11 2.2
10 2.0
472 94.1
9 1.8
Appellate
Opinions
PI Win
N %
80 48.8
12 7.3
121 73.8
33 20.1
10 6.1
130 79.3
15 9.2
19 11.6
95 57.9
11 6.7
58 35.4
28 17.1
3 1.8
1 0.6
1 0.6
131 79.9
2 1.2
7 4.3
155 94.5
98 19.5 59.2* 45 27.4
60 12.0 58.3 33 20.0
Rate
47.5**
50.0**
35,5
57.6
20.0
39,2
60,0
21,1
39.0
63,6
34,5
50.0
100.0
0
100.0
35.1
50.9
57.1
36.0
62.2***
57.6**
244 48.6 57.4*** 74 45.1 46.0*
89 17.7
42 8.4
27 5.4
34 6.8
25 5.0
35 7.0
25 5.0
210 41.8
43 8.6
145 28.9
17 3.4
100 19.9
149 29.7
426 84.7
224 44.6
61.8**
64.3*
51.9
70.6**
52.0
60.0
68.0*
59.5***
62.8
55.9
88.2***
53.0
59.1**
37 22.6
8 4.9
9 5.5
8 4.9
12 7.3
9 5.5
78 47.6
17 10.4
35 21.3
7 4.3
53 32.3
54 32.9
52.8* 140 85.4
59.4*** 87 53.1
46.0
87.5***
66.7*
50.0
66.7**
66.7**
46.2*
70.6***
60.0***
42.9
56.6***
57.9**
44.3***
49.4
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District Court Appellate
Variable Opinions Opinions
P Win P1 Ain
Number % Rate N % Rate
Case covered by 1991 Civil Rights Act
Procedural Posture of Case
Pretrial motion on substnce of clm
Pretrial motion on procedure, evi-
dence
Memorandum order after bench
trial
Motion for judgment notvithstand-
ing verdict
Posttrial motions
Trial in Case
No trial; decided on pretrial mo-
tions
Bench trial
Jury trial
Both bench and jury trial
Number of Individual Defendants
0
1
2
3 or more
Missing/Can't tell
Remedies Awarded to Successful Pls:
Backpay
Attorneys fees
Injunction
Reinstatement
Front Pay
Nominal damages
Punitive damages
Costs to PI
Money judgment
Mean judgment when awarded
Who Appeals
Plaintiff
Defendant
Both
33 6.6
326 64.9
19 3.8
124 24.7
4 0.8
29 5.8
346 68.9
127 25.3
11 2.2
18 3.6
179 35.7
166 33.1
56 11.2
87 17.3
14 2.8
34 cases
45
18
8
5
17
9
32
63
$70,883.72
52.5
79.0
39.5
75.0
65.5
54.1
45.7
54.6
33.3
36.3
59.6
58.9
59.8
57.1
121 73.8 27.3
30 18.3 73.3
13 7.9 69.2
* (**) (***) = variable significant at the .1 (.05) (.001) level of significance
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APPENDIX B
MEASURING OBJEC-rVT=Y OF QUESTIONS THROUGH KAPPA ANALYSIS OF
INTER-RATER AGREEMENT
We tested the objectivity of our variables by having two readers
independently code a random subset comprising about 6% of the
cases, and examining how closely they agreed. Under this "objective"
test, the best reader of a case is not the person with the most clever or
original or thoughtful analysis, but the reader who most often agrees
with others. In turn, the most objective variables are those where the
inter-rater agreement is highest.
As revealed in Table B-i, the coders agreed unanimously on four
variables, and agreed in over 90% of the cases on another sixteen vari-
ables. Indeed, in about two-thirds of our variables, the coders agreed
in over 80% of the cases.
Medical statisticians have long wrestled with similar issues of in-
ter-rater reliability. They have developed a kappa statistic as a more
sophisticated measure than simply eye-balling the percentage of
agreement. In its original application, a kappa statistic evaluates the
degree to which medical professionals reach the same diagnosis when,
for example, rating mammograms as normal, benign disease, suspi-
cious, or cancerous. If the raters guess randomly based only on popu-
lation distributions, the likelihood of agreement can be calculated
and the kappa statistic equals zero. If the raters always agree, the
kappa statistic equals one. For intermediate levels of agreement, the
kappa statistic indicates the proportion between random and full
agreement. For example, suppose two raters agree on the results of a
six-sided dice 50% of the time. If they had randomly guessed based
only on the fact that each choice is 16.7% of the population, they
should agree 16.7% of the time. The kappa statistic for their 50%
agreement is 0.400, showing that .50 is 40% of the distance between
random (.167) agreement and full (1.00) agreement. 17 4
The larger the kappa statistic, then, the greater the degree of
agreement. It has been suggested 175 that the kappa statistic can be
interpreted on the following scale:
174 See generally 2 STATA REFERENCE MANUAL RELEASE 6, at 132-43 (1999) (instructing on
the use of kappa statistics).
175 J. Richard Landis & Gary G. Koch, The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categori.
cal Data, 33 BIoMETmRcs 159, 165 (1977).
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Kappa score Degree of Inter-rater Agreement
< 0.0 Poor
0.00-0.20 Slight
0.21-0.40 Fair
0.41-0.69 Moderate
0.61-0.80 Substantial
0.81-1.00 Almost perfect
Table B-1 groups our variables into these kappa categories.
Again, most of our variables hold up well. About half of the variables
we could test had kappa statistics greater than .5, meaning that the
coders were more than halfvay between random agreement and per-
fect agreement. This is regarded as substantial agreement. Impor-
tantly, most of our key variables show high inter-rater reliability. These
include the procedural posture of the case, the type of employer and
occupation of the victim, and many of the conduct categories.
When our variables are less objective, the problems arise mainly
from missing data. Our coders seemed to differ in how aggressively
they would mine the case for data. The variable "segregation of the
workplace" typifies the problem. The coding sheet asked coders to
choose between (1) mostly male, (2) mostly female, (3) mixed, or (8)
can't tell. Table B-2 shows their responses. The coders agreed in only
seventeen of the thirty-two cases, and the kappa statistic is a "slight"
0.1489. However, we take considerably more comfort in this table than
the summary statistics would suggest. The main problem is that Coder
I was more aggressive in determining the segregation of the
workforce, doing so in half the cases, while Coder 2 gave a substantive
answer in only one-fourth of the cases. Substantively, however, the
coders expressed near unanimous agreement. They both agreed that
no cases had mostly female, and they only substantively disagreed on
one case, which Coder 1 described as mostly male while Coder 2
called it mixed. In general, the substantive disagreement between cod-
ers for almost all variables was minimal.
Based on these results, we have considerable faith that our vari-
ables are "objective" in the sense that well-trained legal professionals
should reach the same answers in most cases.
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APPENDIX TABLE B-i
INTER-RATER AGREEMENT ON VARIABLES
Variable
Almost Perfect Agreement (Kappa=0.81-1.00)
Employer type (private/federal/state)
Physical contact of nonsexual nature
Favorable treatment to employees in sexual relations
Race of victim
Procedural posture of case
Was there a trial
Ruling on Hostile Environment claim
Substantial Agreement (Kappa=0.60-0.80)
Sexual material left in victim's private area
Sex of victims (female, male, both)
Tenure of victim at firm
Number of individual defendants
Marital status of victim
Did supervisor know of harassment
Offensive gestures
Oral comments about plaintiff: belittling names
Harassment off premises, consensual interaction
Physical contact of sexual nature
Case published (officially published/online only)
Victim complained internally
Length of harassment
Moderate Agreement (Kappa=0.40-0.60)
Type of claim (qpq/hostile environment)
Who were harassers (supervisors/coworkers/both)
District court ruling on Quid Pro Quo claim
Occupation of pl (e.g., blue collar, white collar)
Plaintiff told coworkers about harassment
Posters/pinups in public areas
Employer's harassment program (general/specific/none)
Plaintiff told supervisor informally
Requests for sexual favors
Plaintiff's Sexual orientation (gay/straight)
Oral comments about plaintiff. physical appearance
Number of harassers
Less favorable treatment in work assignments
Reasonable standard used by court (person/woman/etc)
Fair Agreement (Kappa=0.20-0.40)
Did Plaintiff request punitive damages
Consent of Plaintiff (e.g., sometimes went along)
Requests for dates
Was jury involved in case
Was jury involved in sex harassment part of case
Pornography in workplace
Pi's Employment status (employed at EEOC filing/etc)
Did victim have relationship at work
Harassment off premises, nonconsensual interaction
Slight Agreement (Kappa=0.00-0.20)
Plaintiff complained formally
Segregation of workforce (mixed, mostly male/female)
Oral comments re women in general: phys appearance
Probability
% of cases Kappa of random
agreed on Statistic rating
100.00
100.00
100.00
93.75
93.75
93.75
87.50
96.88
96.88
84.38
83.87
90.62
84.38
90.62
87.50
93.75
84.38
81.48
78.12
71.88
83.87
71.88
78.12
62.50
90.62
93.75
75.00
75.00
71.88
84.38
62.50
62.50
71.88
78.12
71.88
62.50
84.38
90.62
90.62
81.25
71.88
75.00
81.25
1.0000 0.0000
1.0000 0.0000
1.0000 0.0000
0.8293 0.0000
0.8140 0.0000
0.8140 0.0000
0.8112 0,0000
0.7881 0.0000
0.7867 0.0000
0.7841 0.0000
0.7630 0.0000
0.7618 0.0000
0.7407 0.0000
0.7280 0.0000
0.7211 0.0000
0.7168 0.0001
0.6899 0.0000
0.5833 0.0002
0.6216 0.0000
0.6139 0,0000
0.5856 0.0000
0.5765 0.0000
0.5564 0.0000
0.5288 0.0000
0.5200 0.0014
0.4797 0.0001
0.4733 0.0000
0.4667 0.0020
0.4617 0.0002
0.4521 0.0050
0.4402 0.0001
0.4370 0.0000
0.4364 0.0003
0.4043 0.0011
0.3950 0.0011
0.3836 0.0006
0.3822 0.0023
0.3806 0.0000
0.3806 0.0000
0.3469 0.0009
0.3455 0.0034
0.2809 0.0172
0.2066 0.0274
59.38 0.1875 0.1321
53.12 0,1489 0,1122
68.75 0.0303 0.4103
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Probability
% of cases Kappa of random
Variable agreed on Statistic rating
Poor Agreement (Kappa Below 0.0)
Oral comments re women in general: belittling names 87.50 -0.0492 0.6393
Written comments, i.e., graffiti 87.50 -0.0492 0.6388
Objectionable letters sent to plaintiff 84.38 -0.0596 0.6708
Harassment occurred at work 84.38 -0.0811 0.6807
Insufficient variation to accurately analyze interrater
agreement
Plaintiff told outside friends of harassment 100.00
Did court use social context standard 96.88 0.0000
Plaintiff had someone else complain on her behalf 96.88 0.0000
Public Interest Group Involvement 93.75 0.0000
Harassment occurred off work, at work-related event 90.62 0.0000
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APPENDIX TABLE B-2
LEVEL OF INTER-RATER AGREEMENT SEGREGATED WORKPLACE VARABLE
Coder 2
Mostly Mostly
Male Female Mixed Can't Tell Total
Mostly Male 1 0 1 3 5
Coder I Mostly Female 0 0 0 0 0
Mixed 0 0 3 8 11
Can't Tell 1 0 2 13 16
_ Total 2 0 6 24 32
Percentage Agreement (diagonal cells/total) = 17/32 = 53.12%
Expected agreement (based on overall probability distribution) = 44.9%
Kappa Statistic = [.5312-.4492]/[1-.4492] = .1489
Probability - .1122
